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How does America improve its Irregular Warfare (IW) capability? Academia defines IW 
as encompassing insurgency and terrorism. It is used to counter and defeat Violent Extremist 
Organizations (VEOs) such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State. 2018 saw 9,600 terrorist 
attacks and 49 of the 52 conflicts tracked by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program were non-state 
against state actors.1 IW remains an immediate ongoing concern for America. 
This paper is a historical evaluative dissertation. Chapter one addresses the difficult task 
of studying IW and the differing definitions of IW (or lack of same) and their history. It 
addresses the American military’s relationship with the concept historically and its current status. 
It includes a discussion of how this affects the Special Operations Forces (SOF) that are the 
primary practitioners of IW for the American military.  
Chapter two discusses VEOs, one of the five major threats outlined in the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy (NDS). Case studies assess how terrorists and insurgents seek to shape public 
opinion. The first is a classic insurgency campaign, the Algerian Revolution and the second 
 
1 Barnett S. Koven, Re-evaluating Special Operations Forces-led Counterterrorism Efforts, (Tampa: Joint Special 




covers the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) ground-breaking terror campaign. There is 
also a discussion of ideology and strategy. 
Chapter three analyzes the remaining four threats identified by the NDS: China, Russia, 
Iran, and North Korea. Their use of activities and operations that remain below the threshold of 
traditional warfare are examined. IW is examined through the lens of the national instruments of 
power to discuss policy impacts, ramifications, and countermeasures.  
This thesis finds that IW is the primary venue of modern combat, while traditional 
warfare is brinksmanship similar to the Cold War. IW will remain operationally prominent for 
the foreseeable future. The Department of Defense (DOD) refers to GPC as the ‘new normal,’ 
but American dominance in traditional warfare is unquestioned globally. Likewise, American IW 
capabilities are a known liability, particularly as America has blunted perhaps her sharpest blade, 
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). American military chiefs and policymakers 
have only twice in history prompted efforts to professionalize IW within the military, thus it is 
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How does America correct its strategy to address Irregular Warfare (IW)? IW is primarily 
defined in academia as encompassing both insurgency and terrorism.2 IW is the type of warfare 
America has used to counter and defeat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) such as Al 
Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (ISIS) for the last 20 years.3 In military doctrine the term 
warfare represents the mechanism or mechanics of how war is prosecuted between parties, be 
they state or non-state actors.4 Carl von Clausewitz states that warfare has three main objectives: 
conquer or destroy an enemy’s military, possess an enemy’s source of strength or national 
power, and gain a favorable public opinion.5  
The American military writ large has a problem with strategy of any kind, making this 
one of the most pressing policy questions for the United States (US) government.6 Professor 
 
2 Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk & Thomas S. Szayna; Assessing Irregular Warfare, (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2008), 19. 
3 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report, edited by Donald Rumsfeld, 2006, 1-2. 
4 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 
Joint Staff, 2017, ix-x & 1. 
5 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, Clausewitz.com, Clausewitz Bookstore, accessed May 4th, 2020, 
https://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm. 
6 Steven Metz, Don’t Blame the Generals for the Strategic Shortcomings of America’s Forever Wars, World Politics 






Colin S. Gray notes America’s ‘persisting strategy deficit in its way of war.’7 Professor Gregory 
D. Foster of the National Defense University claims of the current National Defense Strategy: ‘It 
is an ideological tract masquerading as a strategic roadmap; military-centric to the point of 
militarism; operationally, even tactically oriented, neither grand nor elevated; Old War parochial 
and provincial posing as forward-looking, transformative New War.’8 Moreover, the operational 
approach utilized by the DOD over the course of 20 years of IW is considered a broken concept, 
failing to translate tactical successes into strategic victory.9 Adding to the confusion is the newly 
stated (but arguably failed) intention of the DOD to holistically embrace IW as a task for all 
formations in the military.10 On its face this represents a stark change: the recent past saw 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) serving as the main effort.11 
A frequent concern is the advent of military-centric naming conventions (Gray Zone 
Operations, Chinese Unrestricted Warfare or Russian Hybrid Warfare) masquerading as 
strategy. Advances in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that allow for greater 
prosecution of targets (whether on the part of the terror-actor or the counterterrorism (CT) forces 
pursuing them) have often been presented to the policy maker as faux strategy, when in fact they 
are merely a means to continue business as usual – without defining a strategic end state. 
 
7 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?, (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 18. 
8 Gregory Foster, The National Defense Strategy Is No Strategy, Defense One, Government Media Executive Group 
LLC, last updated April 4th, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/national-defense-strategy-no-
strategy/156068/. 
9 Nicholas A. Heras and Carole O'Leary, Political Strategy in Unconventional Warfare: Opportunities lost in 
Eastern Syria and Preparing for the Future, (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2019), 1. 
10 US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy Irregular Warfare Annex Implementation Plan Brief to the 
Military Education Coordination Council, edited by the Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular Warfare, 2019, 2. 
11 US Congress, Senate, Posture Statement on US SOF, General Tony Thomas interview by Senate Armed Services 
Committee, May 4th, 2017. 
   Unites States Marine Corps, Doctrinal Publication 1-3 Tactics, edited by the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command Staff, 2017, 2-19. The main effort is a central maneuver warfare concept: concentrating efforts on 
achieving objectives that lead to victory. Of all the actions going on… recognize one as the most critical to success 
at that moment. The unit assigned responsibility for accomplishing this key mission is designated as the main 




Sometimes new technology drives theories and hypotheses by academics and the military to 
define new trends. This in itself is nothing new; in the late 1800s the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB, also commonly referred to as Fenians) took advantage of the advent of 
Dynamite in their insurgency in an IW campaign known as the Dynamite War.12  
Though these insurgents used cutting-edge terrorism TTPs, the British Crown provided a 
kinetic, direct action CT response with the creation of Scotland Yard’s Special Irish Branch.13 
This enemy-centric approach remains the default response in IW, far outstripping a measured 
populace-influencing response. The IRB were unprepared for the reaction and failed to grasp the 
true difference in terrorism and insurgency: insurgencies may be allowed to drag on, particularly 
poorly executed ones in a colonial holding and outside of the actual homeland. They can be 
denied and mitigated with political half-measures until action is needed. However, sovereign 
states – then and now – are compelled to respond to spectacular terror attacks on their homeland. 
As Major Walter A. Schrepel notes: ‘…terror attacks are pebbles in the shoes of government 
leaders.’14 Governments must respond, or risk providing arguments that they are unfit to hold 
power and unable to secure the populace. In choosing terrorism, the IRB provoked a response 
that ultimately nullified any benefit derived from their technical advances (Dynamite), and the 
rebellion was thrown into disarray for decades.  
IW also uses asymmetric attacks to exploit vulnerabilities in long-standing systems. In 
the 9/11 attacks, terrorists seized control of airliners and flew them into the World Trade Center 
towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania (owing to the failure of the plot in one 
 
12 Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 13. 
13 Ian Adams and Ray Wilson, Special Branch: A History 1883-2006, (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015), Kindle 
CH 1 
14 Walter A. Schrepel, “Paras and Centurions: Lessons Learned from the Battle of Algiers,” Peace and Conflict: 




instance). 9/11 was so effective that it changed the world economy for all intents and purposes, 
resulting in an estimated $80-90 Billion in realized effects globally.15 Such effects were far 
beyond the hopes of AQ and it has been referred to as a Black Swan event.16  But it also forced a 
response by attacking the American homeland. The ensuing Global War on Terror redefined 
kinetic, direct action CT operations. Clearly such a detrimental effect to their own operations 
was not the desired end state of AQ. 
IW remains an immediate and ongoing concern for America… as recently as 2018 there 
were over 9600 documented terrorist attacks and 49 of the 52 active conflicts tracked by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program were non-state against state actors. 17 Moreover, the vast 
majority of US military engagements throughout history (not just the last two decades) were IW 
engagements.  
The first chapter of this paper examines the difficult task of studying IW and the resulting 
definitions of IW (or lack of same) and their history. It addresses the American military’s 
relationship with the concept historically and its current status. It includes a discussion of how 
this has affected the SOF that are the primary practitioners of IW for the American military. 
Chapter Two discusses Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), identified by the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) as one of the threats facing America. Terrorists and insurgents seek to 
shape public opinion and identifying their ideology, as well as America’s doctrinal responses, are 
critical requirements. There are two case studies: the first is a classic insurgency campaign, the 
Algerian Revolution. The second covers the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) ground-
 
15 Todd Sandler, “Terrorism and counterterrorism: An overview,” Oxford Economic Papers, (2015): 2. 
16 Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller, "The Curse of the Black Swan," Journal of Risk Research 19, no. 10, (2016): 
1320.  
17 Barnett S. Koven, Re-evaluating Special Operations Forces-led Counterterrorism Efforts, (Tampa: Joint Special 




breaking terror campaign. Chapter Three covers the relationship outlined in the NDS between 
Great Power Competition (GPC) and IW as displayed by the remaining four parties discussed in 
the NDS (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea).  
This thesis finds that IW is the primary venue of modern combat, while GPC is merely 
brinksmanship similar to the Cold War. IW will remain operationally prominent for the 
foreseeable future. The DOD refers to GPC as the ‘new normal,’ but American dominance in 
traditional warfare is unquestioned globally. Likewise, American IW capabilities are a known 
liability. American military chiefs and policymakers have only twice in history prompted efforts 
to professionalize IW within the military. History, doctrine, academia, and career soldiers agree 
on this, but it remains unlikely that the DOD will shift from its current course. IW will most 












Chapter 1 – A Touch of Gray 
 
Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.18 
-T.E. Lawrence 
 
What effect has poor American IW strategy had on policy and practitioners? This 
chapter’s first section addresses academic literature and studies of IW, followed by a section on 
context that covers definitions and strategic constructs. It finally looks at America’s historic 
usage of IW. Section II examines American IW policy post-WWII and post-Vietnam, then looks 
at the leading roles American policymakers played. Finally, section III of this chapter examines 
the effects of American policy on USSOCOM. In closing, this chapter notes the predominance of 
IW as a mode of warfare. America’s lack of strategy has essentially placed the burden of IW 










I. ACADEMIA, CONTEXT AND HISTORY 
a. ACADEMIA 
Academics have significant difficulties in the study of IW, both terrorism and insurgency. 
This is no small issue, as Czwarno notes that academia plays a critical role. Their singular focus 
of study produces policy papers, panel appearances, and other channels of communication to 
advise government policy makers on developing trends. As an example, she ties the academic 
community’s pre-9/11 focus on Asia studies to their failure to alert policy makers to the threat of 
radical Islam (though this is hardly the singular factor in the event).19 Czwarno also notes that 
the academic will have the benefit of time to research within a well-rounded field of study; she 
contrasts this with military intelligence officers who exercise only a short-term scope of research 
typically limited to early warning of imminent attacks.20 This is also noted by McFate and 
Fondacaro, finding that intelligence cells focus on the ‘identification of targets. Most intelligence 
offices have their hands full with that particular task and are not trained, manned, or organized to 
undertake investigation of the local sociocultural context.’21 
Marc Sageman notes that the post-9/11 surge of federal funding to terror research had a 
counterintuitive and injurious effect on the academic community... the result is that the study of 
ideology and drivers of terrorism stagnated.22 Money has driven a very mercenary effect towards 
research by some. Coupled with a general lack of accurate material the results have been lack-
 
19 Monica Czwarno, “Misjudging Islamic Terrorism: The Academic Community’s Failure to Predict 9/11” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 29, (2006): 657. 
20 Ibid., 660. 
21 Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro, “Reflections on the Human Terrain System in the First 4 Years,” 
Prism 2, no. 4 (2011): 70. 





luster, and schools have shied away from supporting studies. Thus, talented researchers eschew 
the topic, forming a vicious negative feedback loop.23  
Stoker and Whiteside note a disturbing trend of decreased knowledge of military history 
and theory, particularly as it relates to standards such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as well as… 
…the not-always beneficial drive to develop something new in academic circles. 
This is particularly true in the international affairs and political science realms, 
where too often there is professional pressure to develop another microtheory 
(sic) to explain an element of political or military behavior or practice and then to 
fit history into it rather than to analyze the past to see what patterns develop and 
what we can learn.24 
 
American military leaders, particularly those selected for field grade command and higher, spend 
significant amounts of time engaging in academic research; it should be no surprise when they 
fall into the same habits of other academics and assign new and inappropriate typologies to 
terrorists’ modus operandi.25  The officer field is known to ‘eat their own’ via brutal competition, 
so identifying and naming the latest trend in warfare would not only serve to educate the force 
but also cement one’s military career as a rising star. Since (at least) the Dynamite War of the 
IRB, new tactical concepts have been offered to replace actual strategy. However, Stoker and 
Whiteside also note ‘…when new terms appear—and they will—they must be tested 
immediately against history and existing theory. Most new so-called classifications of war would 
be instantly killed if properly examined through these lenses.’26  
 
23 Marc Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,’ Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 569-
570, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649. 
24 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, ‘Blurred Lines - Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of 
American Strategic Thinking,’ Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (2020): 27. 
25 Bart Schuurman, Lasse Lindekilde, Stefan Malthaner, Francis O'Connor, Paul Gill & Noémie Bouhana, ‘End of 
the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 8 (2019): 775. 
26 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, "Blurred Lines - Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of 









b. CONTEXT: HOW IW FITS IN THE PICTURE 
Terms such as Hybrid War, Unrestricted Warfare, and Gray Zone attempt to describe 
competition outside the norms of traditional warfare. Today these contentious activities are 
specifically designed to fall short of triggering armed response. These terms needlessly duplicate 
the term IW, which has the precedent of being both a legally defined and doctrinal term. The 
National Defense Authorization Act §1202 (Support of special operations for irregular warfare) 
defines IW as – ‘activities in support of predetermined United States policy and military 
objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and 
individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional 
armed conflict (emphasis is the author’s).’28 Such a definition is broad enough to encompass all 
manner of specifics from the three aforementioned terms. Gray further explains: ‘Defense 
communities great and small, regular and irregular, are always in the market for some magic 
device or wonderful new method of warfare that should enable its owner-practitioner to evade 
the lore of strategy, with all its difficulties.’29 
Strategy is a critical concept that underpins IW in its difference from traditional warfare. 
This must not be confused with Grand Strategy: the first is the larger use of military power in 
pursuing a political objective, and is an element of the second. Grand Strategy is the use of all 
policy and instruments of national power (frequently referred to as Diplomatic, Informational, 
Military, and Economic – or DIME) in pursuit of the political national interests.30 The strategic 
 
27 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, ‘Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label,’ January 2016, Project 
Report - Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Definitions, Capabilities, Scope and Possible Responses, Kikimora 
Publications at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
28 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, House Resolution 2810, 115th Cong., (January 3, 2017), 
§ 1202 Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare. 
29 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, (Kent: Orion, 2005), 214. 
30 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, "Blurred Lines - Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of 




level of warfare is the uppermost echelon of military operational art that touches on policy aims 
directly; as a mechanism it requires an identifiable military end-state which can be achieved and 
implemented within a larger political framework.31 The criticality of the linkage between policy 
(Grand Strategy) and defined military end states (Strategy) cannot be overstated. America’s 4-
year election cycle (occasionally bumped down to two-years if the Congress creates a lame duck 
President) was designed by the same Constitution that eschewed a standing Army… its effects 
on the aforementioned processes is deleterious almost by design. Meanwhile the Chinese have a 
hundred-year plan. The only means to overcome the inherently unstable transition of power 
between parties and people is the agreeance of concepts defined by doctrinal restraints and 
constraints. Failing to utilize these ‘left and right limits’ (military term to describe a field of fire 
being assigned to a soldier) essentially guarantees operational chaos. 
The next descending level of warfare is the operational level, which links strategic 
military end-states to tactical objectives by sequencing the arrangement of actions and elements 
in time, space, and purpose; this is accomplished by striking the enemy’s strongest point that 
provides the will or ability to wage war, known as a center of gravity (COG).32 Thus the COGs 
in traditional warfare almost always provide a capability (such as military elements, units, or 
leadership) and are targeted by offensive, defensive, or stability operations.33 The COG for IW is 
most frequently defined as the third option from Clausewitz – a favorable public opinion, and 
was famously described by Mao Tse-Tung as the support of the people, who are ‘the water’ in 
 
31 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 
Joint Staff, 2017, I-7 & I-8. 
32 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, "Blurred Lines - Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of 
American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (2020): 5. 
33 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 




which the guerilla swims.34 IW operations must be assessed by their impact upon popular 
legitimacy and their influence upon relevant populations. This stands in stark contrast to the 
quaint and somewhat anachronistic outlook of traditional warfare, which considers the 
indigenous people of a battle area to be agnostic for all intents and purposes – simply 
succumbing to either victory or defeat.35  
Finally, the tactical level of warfare is planning and execution to achieve military 
objectives assigned to tactical units in battle.36 ‘Guerrilla’ (literally small war) tactics are also 
known as asymmetric (which has threatened to become another distracting label) – leveraging a 
weaker force’s options to advantage against a stronger force. They avoid large-scale, direct, 
prolonged confrontations (thus the common description ‘hit and run’). Moghadam, et al, posit 
that guerilla warfare or insurgent operations target uniformed forces of the opposition, while 
terrorism is used to target civilians or those not engaged in combat, for the express purpose of 
spectacle and psychological impact.37 By contrast, counterinsurgent troops must tactically 
accomplish three key tasks: force protection (of their own elements against insurgent attacks), 
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, and physical elimination of 
insurgents.38 These are in tension with each other (particularly when viewed through the lens of 
popular sentiment); frequently, accomplishing one of these tasks results in failing at another.39 
 
34 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: Praeger, 1961), 93. 
    Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Principles of War,’ Clausewitz.com, Clausewitz Bookstore, accessed May 4th, 2020, 
https://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm. 
35 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 
Joint Staff, 2017, I-6. 
36 Ibid., I-8. 
37 Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger and Polina Beliakova, "Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing 
Contemporary Terrorist Actors," Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (October 2014): 5. 






The term IW and its definition are rife with detractors, variations, and synonyms. As 
noted previously, §1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (Support of special 
operations for irregular warfare) provides a legally binding definition of IW, which notably 
specifies ‘competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.’ 
Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, also offers a basic 
definition of IW:  
…a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). This form [of warfare] is labeled as irregular in 
order to highlight its non-Westphalian context. The strategic point of IW is to gain 
or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. 
IW emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare although it is not a 
historical form of warfare. In IW a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or 
negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, 
which usually serves that nation’s established government.40  
 
The terms ‘violent’ and ‘non-Westphalian’ suggest the military doctrine has a different 
scope on how it sees IW than the USG writ large, and the specification of violence begs the 
question: how does the DOD intend to pursue IW if it is a clash of ideologies without violence? 
This paper specifically discusses the Russian annexation of Crimea, which happened with almost 
no violence.41 Non-Westphalian sets IW apart from warfare between members of the community 
of nations (state actors), which the military defines as traditional warfare.42 There are several 
implications to the Westphalian concept (frequently used as a term for the modern state system 
of neo-liberal global government ) but the two most common are that sovereign states maintain a 
 
40 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 
Joint Staff, 2017, I-6. 
41 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, ‘Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label,’ January 2016, Project 
Report - Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Definitions, Capabilities, Scope and Possible Responses, Kikimora 
Publications at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
42 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 




monopoly of force within their territories and do not interfere in domestic issues of their 
neighbors.43 Traditional warfare is thus limited to state-versus-state conflict and precludes one 
country intervening in another’s internal battles. It is characterized as the maneuver of combat 
formations into tactical position to utilize firepower (thus the term fire and maneuver) to 
accomplish the ‘defeat of an adversary’s armed forces, the destruction of an adversary’s war-
making capacity, and/or the seizure or retention of territory.’44 Though it is the last mentioned, 
seizing terrain may be the most readily identified aspect of traditional warfare. 
IW breaks from the Westphalian concept by encompassing incursions into the sovereign 
state of other countries by external sponsors and sovereign states losing the monopoly on use of 
force, as seen in terrorism and insurgency. It is frequently characterized in terms of exhaustion 
and erosion.45 Defensive missions used in IW include counterterrorism (CT) 46, 
counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID)47, and Stability operations48 (when 
supporting a sovereign state against insurgency). Unconventional warfare (UW, support of an 
insurgency) is an offensive IW mission to affect regime change. Koven notes that CT, and 
specifically kinetic CT missions such as drone strikes, are the US Government’s (USG) preferred 
response, with over 80 percent of the USG CT budget going to agencies principally engaged in 
 
43 Richard Coggins, ‘Westphalian State System,’ Oxford Reference, Oxford University Press, last accessed March 
8th, 2020, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803121924198 
44 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, edited by the 
Joint Staff, 2017, I-5. 
45 Ibid., I-4. 
46 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?, (Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 18. 
    Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk & Thomas S. Szayna; Assessing Irregular Warfare, (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2008), 51. 
47 US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations, edited by the Joint Staff, 2017, II-10. FID 
refers to US activities that support a HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program designed 
to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and 
stability. 
48 US Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05 Stabilization, edited by the Joint Staff, 2018, 15. Stabilization is a 
political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate 




military or law enforcement efforts to disrupt terrorism between 2002 and 2017.49 COIN saw a 
renaissance in the 2000s but is already an afterthought in the new GPC environment.50 UW, FID 
and Stability Operations are given little attention by the military writ large. Notably, the amount 
of USG funding for IW activities by SOF is $10M.51 However, title 10 U.S. Code § 127e 
(Support of special operations to combat terrorism) provides $100M for combatting terrorism 
(the kinetic-based subset of IW), once again displaying bias for kinetic operations.52 
Figure 1 Joint irregular warfare activities53
 
 
49 Barnett S. Koven, Re-evaluating Special Operations Forces-led Counterterrorism Efforts, (Tampa: Joint Special 
Operations University, 2019), 1. 
50 David H. Ucko, “Learning Difficulties: The US Way of Irregular Warfare,” Themenschwerpunkt 36, (2018): 23. 
51 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, House Resolution 2810, 115th Cong., (January 3, 2017), 
§ 1202 Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare. 
52 US Congress, ‘10 U.S. Code § 127e. Support of special operations to combat terrorism,’ Legal Information 
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 Compounding this dynamic within DOD is America’s broken culture of strategic 
planning and the impulse to seize upon buzzwords and tactics as faux doctrine. Blurred Lines 
discusses ‘the construction of elements of U.S. strategy on myth and misunderstanding and the 
militarization of grand strategy… the tacticization of strategy. U.S. leaders have taken a badly 
formed tactical concept and used it as one of the pillars for the creation of strategy.’54 This 
reflects the USG and USSOCOM bias for kinetic action, and played out in the drone program as 
well. Bush latched onto the technical advancement drones experienced under his administration, 
but Obama ordered 10 times more strikes than Bush.55 This is a classic move by Democratic 
Presidents to use tech (or SOF) that allows a small BOG signature while still taking action 
operationally.56 Meanwhile President Obama’s nearly 5,000 drone strikes resulted in multiple 
warnings from his staff between 2009-2013, noting that they ‘systematically undermined the 
U.S. effort to quell terrorism by creating more support for al Qaeda… Some mid-level CIA 
officers opposed the strikes in Pakistan as early as 2009… they were infuriating Muslim males 
and making them more willing to join al Qaeda.’57 Under President Trump, drone strikes are on 
pace to increase yet again in some regions.58  
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Figure 2 Yemeni soldier looks at graffiti protesting U.S. drone strike in Sanaa, Yemen.59 
 
In JP 1, the DOD stipulates (with typical understatement) that ‘the symmetry between the 
naming conventions of traditional and irregular warfare is not ideal.’60 Many political dynamics 
certainly account for this, one of them being the deliberate move away from the term UW. UW is 
commonly, and incorrectly, used as interchangeable with IW, for example in the US Army’s 
description of Russian UW activities.61  
Perhaps the most relevant reason to move away from UW is the advent of Public Law 
114-92 Sec. 1097, S.1356 — 114th Congress (2015-2016), National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, which defines UW as ‘activities conducted to enable a resistance 
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movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.’62 Thus, 
UW is very specifically a resistance-based operation under the larger umbrella term IW for DOD 
doctrine. UW is also prescribed by USSOCOM to the US Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) which acts as the lead component for UW in the DOD. Specifically, US Army 
Special Forces, known as the Green Berets, are the only DOD formation organized, trained and 
equipped for UW, whereas IW is a mission that may now be tasked (at least theoretically) to all 
DOD elements.63  
c. AMERICA’S IW HISTORY 
Clearly IW is a historic form of warfare. One synonym, Small Wars, has been in use 
since at least 1899 when British Major Charles Edward Callwell of His Majesty’s Royal Artillery 
penned Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.64 He defines Small Wars to ‘include all 
campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises 
the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, campaigns 
undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerilla warfare in a parts of the world (sic) where 
organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field. It 
thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.’65 Similarly, 
the Small Wars Manual published by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in 1940 defines 
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Small Wars as: ‘Operations… wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the 
internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or un-
satisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign 
policy of our Nation.’66 Thus the concept has included whole-of-government responses 
combined with military force in uncertain situations beneath the scope of traditional warfare 
since the outset. 
These definitions denote a wide range of possible permutations and there is no commonly 
accepted definition. As such, this paper moves on to address IW with a functional framework of 
approaches in the current strategic context of GPC. IW operations of the greatest policy interest 
are of two main types: population-centric IW (typically COIN) and enemy-centric CT. Gray 
confirms this concept: ‘The irregular enemies alluded to… are assumed to be insurgents and 
terrorists.’ He further specifies that ‘despite the wide range of terrorist-insurgent challenges… a 
single “working theory” (emphasis is the author’s) of irregular warfare and how best to oppose it 
has sufficient integrity to deserve our confidence.’67 
The regularity with which America engages in IW operations (and the fact it generated a 
manual to codify them as far back as 1940) denotes again how poorly the term Irregular captures 
the concept. Max Boot makes clear in his book Invisible Armies that America’s IW experience 
dates back to the American Revolution – and not just in tactical terms but also in strategic and 
political aspects.68 The spread of literacy and increased publication of documents such as 
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Thomas Paine's pamphlet Common Sense and The Declaration of Independence appealed to 
British public opinion (a term which first appeared in 1776 appropriately enough). The British 
House of Commons voted by a narrow margin to discontinue offensive operations in 1782, and 
with the loss of Parliament’s blessing King George was forced to relent.69 This clearly 
demonstrated a victory through gaining a favorable public opinion, but it also illustrates the 
American military’s propensity to forget hard-won knowledge (an unfortunate and recurring 
theme), as noted in an interview with Colonel David Hackworth: 
We didn't learn from the past. We didn't learn from our own experience by going 
back to when we beat Britain in 1776. At that time the British had argued that we 
didn't fight in formations such as theirs, a big block formation; we didn't meet 
them in the open and we fought like the Indians, behind trees, using concealment 
and cover and so on. And a couple of hundred years later we had the British 
mentality towards fighting and we had forgotten the very lessons that we had 
taught the British.70 
 
The Small Wars Journal website notes: ‘During the 20th Century, the United States 
arguably engaged in Peer on Peer battle [traditional form of warfare] four times… World War I, 
World War II, the Korean War, and the first Gulf War.’ It further notes ‘In the introduction of 
the Small Wars Manual, the authors state, “Small wars represent the normal and frequent 
operations of the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine Corps… 
landed troops 180 times in 37 countries from 1800 to 1934.”’71 
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Figure 3 Typology of conflict: the reality of war72 
 
 
Traditional warfare is actually the more recent innovation from a historical view… IW in 
the form of tribal warfare has been the mechanism of choice in the majority of human 
experience.73 Boot notes: ‘In some places, states emerged only in the past century, and their 
ability to carry out such basic functions as maintaining an army remains tenuous at best.’74 Gray 
concurs: ‘Historically assessed, symmetrical warfare has been the rare exception, not the rule.’75 
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And Professor Hy Rothstein adds: ‘American strategic culture has difficulty accepting… small 
wars during what is presumably peacetime. Americans insist on defining war and peace as 
distinct and mutually exclusive.’76 Thus the idea of a perpetual state of ongoing IW sits poorly 
with both the American political body and public who, in true capitalist form, seek out peace 
dividends.77 
II. AMERICA’S IW POLICY AND POLICYMAKERS 
a. POST-WWII 
The election of John F. Kennedy (JFK) to President and the general environment post-
WWII appeared to change the tides regarding IW. Counterintuitively, people saw the end of 
violence globally as an opportunity to use violence locally for their own purposes. Colonial 
powers had shown their weakness when they were forced to raise indigenous leaders and 
intellectuals for WWII efforts.78 These same indigenous leaders took advantage of the United 
Nations’ propaganda regarding self-determination, and Mao formalized and codified a proven 
model to guide local uprisings as the post-colonial world unfolded.79 The world was ripe for 
revolution and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Khrushchev promised to 
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support ‘just wars of liberation and popular uprisings.’80 Revolutions flourished in numerous 
locations such as Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam.81 
Algeria is often cited as the classic instance of insurgent warfare, and proved that 
France’s defeat in Indochina could be recreated.82 Indeed, when asked what America should 
have learned from France prior to Vietnam (i.e. regarding French defeats in Indochina and 
Algeria), Colonel Hackworth noted: 
Well, I think the major lesson they should have learned was that that war didn't 
involve the security of France, and the security of the United States wasn't at issue 
either. On a tactical level, they didn't have an objective. The Americans should 
have studied the lessons of the French very closely and taken something from 
them. A correspondent once asked General Westmoreland, the American 
commanding general and architect of the war, what he thought of how the French 
fought the war and was he studying the lessons of the French? He said, "Why 
should I study the lessons of the French? They haven't won a war since 
Napoleon." This was the American attitude of total arrogance.83 
 
 
Once in office JFK addressed this revolutionary scenario through IW and specifically 
UW. He directed Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) McNamara to create Special Group (Counter-
Insurgency) and the US Army to include COIN in all levels of training curricula.84 He shifted 
responsibility for UW from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the DOD, which resulted in 
the deployment of the US Army’s 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to Vietnam in September, 
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1961.85 JFK visited Brigadier General William Yarborough at the US Army Special Warfare 
Center at Fort Bragg, NC, a month later.86 
Figure 4 JFK and Brigadier General Yarborough, Fort Bragg, NC87 
 
 Yarborough risked wearing his unauthorized beret to meet the President; the meeting 
impressed JFK such that he gave public support to the US Army Special Forces in an official 
memorandum to the Army, noting “The Green Beret is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a 
badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.”88 
The US Army introduced Field Manual (FM) 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces, 
FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations, and FM 31-22(A) US Army Counterinsurgency Forces.89 
However, the ground gained in addressing IW would not last after Kennedy’s assassination. The 
loss of his patronage allowed for the dominant negative sentiment towards Special Forces by the 
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US Army’s conventional leadership. One Army General labeled them as ‘fugitives from 
responsibility’ owing to their work beyond the normal Army chain of command with projects 
such as the Village Defense Program and Special Observations Group (decentralized operations 
that allowed the Special Forces to engage with the indigenous populace.)90 While there were 
ignominious episodes (as there are in any organization), these were played up more to deride the 
Special Forces in general than as any specific operational deficiency.91 The US Army had never 
accepted the concept of Special Forces conducting true UW, and refused to see them as anything 
more than “high-speed” infantry as noted by Colonel Aaron Bank (founder of the Green Berets) 
himself: 
The time had come to stop trying to sell Special Forces by passing them off as 
super-Rangers. We pointed out that it definitely showed duplication and overlap. 
The Special Forces mission should drop any reference to Ranger and commando 
operations and should define clearly Special Forces Operations (UW) with 
emphasis on deep penetration (strategic), an unlimited time factor, and 
exploitation of the guerrilla potential.92 
 
b. POST-VIETNAM 
Rothstein notes that post-Vietnam, ‘the Army in particular embarked upon a process of 
doctrinal renewal focusing on large-scale conventional warfare… In effect, the army exorcised 
itself doctrinally of the fundamental problems that irregular threats presented.’93 The Small Wars 
Journal website notes that ‘following US withdrawal from Vietnam, many of these lessons 
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learned [in IW] were forgotten and the focus shifted back to regular warfare throughout the latter 
three decades of the 20th Century.’94 Indeed, the Army reduction of Green Berets from 13,000 to 
3,000 men between 1969 and 1980 reveals the true threat of eradication facing the UW force.95 
Institutional bias against IW within DOD should be an ongoing concern. Regardless of 
talking points that ‘IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DOD must be 
equally capable in both,’ and the ‘DOD will be proficient in IW,’ history suggests a healthy 
skepticism is appropriate.96 Vacca and Davidson note that a historical trend of dismissing 
unorthodox tactics as diverting from true military methods can be seen post-conflict.97 As noted 
by Gray over a decade ago: ‘Readers who suspect that irregular warfare is a convenient catch-all 
concept are mainly correct.’98 It is clear that IW largely consists of the throw-away variations of 
warfare disparaged by the US for decades. Ucko demonstrates that even in the post-9/11 world 
this has not truly changed: 
In terms of organizational structures, the U.S. Army – the main military actor in 
counterinsurgency – showed no desire to reorient its force structure to augment 
seriously its suitability for counterinsurgency. Incidentally, America’s re-
engagement with counterinsurgency coincided with what the Army termed “the 
most ambitious restructuring of its forces since World War II,” namely their 
modularization into brigade combat teams (BCTs) of 3,500-4,000 soldiers 
each. The fluidity resulting from such flux might have been exploited to 
incorporate some of the urgent lessons drawn from on-going campaigns, such as 
the need for military police, engineers, medical units, civil affairs, linguists, 
psychological operations (PSYOPS), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
teams, to name but a few of the assets commonly called for but available in far 
too short supply. Instead, the BCT units, though marketed as flexible, remain 
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near-exclusively configured for major combat operations. Despite stability 
operations having been designated by the Department of Defense as equal in 
importance to conventional combat, no part of the force structure was specifically 
oriented toward the tasks of such operations: the establishment of civil security 
and control, the restoration of essential services, and support to governance and to 
economic and infrastructure development.99 
 
History clearly shows that the GPC of the Cold War era always played out as IW. The 
60s and 70s saw solid evidence of hybrid models, with state actors partnering with non-state 
terrorists to achieve best effects across both models. Socialists, Communists, and Middle Eastern 
actors have all worked together in IW against America and her allies. America’s allies from 
WWII became her nemesis, and they were backing numerous revolutions to spread Communist 
influence.100 The Soviet Union sponsored the PLO once Yuri Andropov took power in 1967.101 
The Chinese also sponsored the PLO as early as 1960, and would eventually provide doctrine, 
weapons, money and officer exchanges.102 As early as 1967 the East Germany Communist 
regime was supporting Palestinian terrorists and their various political organizations, backing the 
‘Zionism as Racism’ resolution by the United Nations (UN) in November of 1975: 
In June 1979, the Stasi signed a formal agreement of cooperation with the PLO 
intelligence services based on their shared interest in preventing the use of East 
Germany as a base for terrorist operations against Western Europe and, instead, 
fostering it as a base for terrorist operations against Israel. The contact between 
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the two services was Counterterrorism Department XXII, run by Gerhard 
Neiber.103 
 
The DOD’s claim that traditional warfare must now take priority over IW in the 21st century’s 
GPC seems a convenience which is half-hearted at best and fraudulent at worst. 
c. POLICYMAKERS TAKE THE LEAD 
The ubiquitous nature of IW in American policy has resulted in the rise of SOF as the 
operational unit of choice; this in itself may be taken as a proof of concept that IW is an 
omnipresent concern. IW and SOF both run counter to the traditions and culture of the military 
services (as hinted at by Colonel Yarborough wearing an unauthorized beret to meet the 
President).104 In the 1970s the PLO and their unique IW effects directly led to the rise of SOF 
and CT units across the western world, including GSG-9 in Germany, GIGN in France, and 
others.105 America flirted with the concept of a CT force but it would take the 1979 hostage 
scenario in Iran to force the deployment of America’s recently created CT unit, Special Forces 
Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D, commonly referred to as Delta Force).106 
These operations were poorly supported across the American military due to service-
specific parochial mentality (Delta and SOF had no parent unit or accompanying General 
Officers to provide patronage at the time). The resulting catastrophe during Operation Eagle 
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Claw killed 8 service members in the Iranian desert, which prompted legislative action in the 
form of the Goldwater/Nichols Act and the Nunn/Cohen Amendment. This legislation is the 
origin of USSOCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the late 80s and 
forced the military services to adapt to the future of joint service operations.107 The Joint 
Explanatory Statement accompanying the legislation paints a clear picture of the problem: 
Although several elements of this provision [special operations reorganization] 
are more specific than may normally be expected in this legislation, the conferees 
determined that the seriousness of the problems and the inability or unwillingness 
of the Defense Department to solve them left no alternative. The action of the 
conference committee is fully consistent with the power provided in the 
Constitution for the Congress to ‘provide for the common Defense’. The 
conferees determined that the failure to act forcefully in this area and at this time 
would be inconsistent with the responsibilities of the Congress to the American 
people.108 
 
In the 80s the Reagan Doctrine of rolling back achievements gained by the USSR due to 
subversion and communist-backed insurgencies provided a last-minute reprieve for UW and the 
Green Berets. The Army Chief of Staff (the senior Army General) acted as patron and deployed 
the 7th Special Forces Group to Central and South America. Congress demanded a small Boots 
on the Ground (BOG) operational signature, so no more than 55 Americans ever deployed into 
country at any one time, but their IW operations were nonetheless successful.109American SOF 
also conducted IW to support Afghanistan’s freedom fighters in their war against the occupying 
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USSR. Although successful in the short term, this played a role in the creation of AQ.110 During 
the 80s terrorism shifted from primarily state-sponsored towards a non-state sponsored and 
religious aspect which played out in the Iranian hostage crisis and the Mujahedeen response to 
the  invasion of Afghanistan, but American policy makers still failed to realize it.111 Entering the 
90s American SOF had developed exquisite enemy-centric CT and kinetic capabilities in the 
form of SFOD-D and JSOC. However, little changed regarding populace-oriented IW, the use of 
Special Forces in UW, or the relations with General Officers. During Desert Shield, SF teams 
made nearly immediate link-up with the Kuwaiti resistance, which provided 95% of the 
intelligence. But they were prevented from conducting UW by those who felt it was too high risk 
or that they needed more training, including General Schwarzkopf.112 Later in the 90s, Operation 
Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu revealed America’s shortcomings in conducting IW. When Task 
Force Ranger requested Abrams tanks, Bradley armored vehicles, and an AC-130 gunship, the 
Clinton administration denied those requests thinking it was too large an operational signature.113 
Though the mission was a success, two helicopters were unexpectedly shot down and 18 
American soldiers killed as the mission transitioned to a recovery effort. Another 73 were 
injured. The Wall Street Journal reported: 
Many military experts believe that if the U.S. forces had had armor, fewer would 
have died. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin resigned two months after Somalia, 
having acknowledged that his decision on the armor had been an error. A 1994 
Senate Armed Services Committee investigation reached the same conclusion. 
But perhaps the most poignant statement came from retired Lieutenant Colonel 
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Larry Joyce, father of Sergeant Casey Joyce, a Ranger killed in Mogadishu: "Had 
there been armor... I contend that my son would probably be alive today..."114 
 
 
American policy makers failed to realize the true power of the Somali warlords and fell 
into not one but two frequently seen IW traps:  
1. Policy overreach without the full intent to execute the mission – the successful 
mission was followed by US withdrawal from Somalia and the release of those 
detained during Gothic Serpent, begging the question: why go after them in the first 
place?115 
2. Over-extension of an elite unit – as will be discussed in Chapter 2, elite military units 
suffer from poor mission concepts regularly in IW. This is not the first time a military 
unit was denied a mission essential requirement or sent against a target beyond the 
scope of their capabilities for political reasons. Another example is the use of Navy 
Sea, Air, and Land platoons (SEALs) for the seizure of Paitilla airfield in Panama 
(not a doctrinal mission for SEALs) that resulted in four killed in action and seven 
others wounded.116 
 
In 1997 the CIA learned that AQ had sent trainers to Somalia in 1992, fearing that the operations 
there were in preparation to seek bin Laden in Sudan: ‘They coached the [Somali militia] rocket-
propelled grenade guys to aim for the tail rotors of U.S. Black Hawks,’ according to Mark 
Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down.117 Scholar Richard Shultz notes that risk-averse 
leadership after Somalia and Clinton-era policy which held terrorism to be a law enforcement 
issue resulted in reticence to engage in offensive CT, allowing AQ’s 9/11 plot to unfold.118  
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Besides the response to 9/11 as an obvious driving factor, Donald Rumsfeld and Michael 
Vickers are primarily responsible for both the resurgence of IW policy and the continued linkage 
to SOF as practitioners. Rumsfeld, serving as SECDEF under President George W. Bush, began 
a comprehensive move to shift the DOD into IW footing and directly linked it to an increase in 
SOF manning, capability, and authority. Maria Ryan notes that as early as 2001, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) records Rumsfeld questioning the need for the All Domain Dominance 
campaign plan (famously known as the ‘war-on-two-fronts’) derived from operations occurring 
in both the European and Pacific theaters in WWII. Rumsfeld did not refer to an IW capability 
by name but laid ground work for exactly such capabilities.119 The QDR noted that state-based 
threats of a conventional nature no longer held exclusive sway in security affairs. Armed conflict 
had changed ‘in ways that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent… [I]t 
is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States 
must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, 
deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.’120 Nor was this merely reactive 
to the attacks of 9/11; the QDR was almost entirely written prior to the event. Ryan contends that 
Rumsfeld saw the lack of IW capability as a gap in the All Domain Dominance plan which 
needed mending.121 
Rumsfeld would continue pushing SOF to lead the fight: he directed General Charles 
Holland, then commander of USSOCOM, to plan for the future accordingly. The 2004 Unified 
Command Plan designated the USSOCOM commander as ‘the lead combatant commander for 
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planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks 
in coordination with combatant commanders.’122 Ryan astutely notes that this move was 
countercultural in the military; the conventional services had distanced themselves from SOF (as 
well as IW) and then been forced by operational failure and legislation to operate in a joint 
service capacity.123 Conventional commands opposed giving USSOCOM synchronizing 
authority – meaning it could issue orders to other commands regarding global counterterrorism 
operations.124 The ubiquity of IW led to SOF as the force of choice. Gray noted as early as 2005 
that ‘given the contemporary and widely anticipated future dominance of irregular warfare over 
regular warfare, it is not surprising that SOF around the world appear to be entering a golden 
era.’125 
By the time the 2006 QDR was released a comprehensive IW policy was fully realized:  
In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant 
form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; 
accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, 
including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations.126 
 
The SOF baseline budget had increased by 81% since 2001. The Army’s Special Forces 
Qualification Course (SFQC) increased its graduation rate from 282 new active duty enlisted 
Special Forces personnel in 2001 to 617 new personnel in 2005 – the equivalent of an additional 
SF Battalion each year – and continued to push towards a goal of graduating 750 students per 
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year.127 Rumsfeld ordered the Army to expand active duty Special Forces battalions by one-third 
by Fiscal Year 2007 (essentially an increase of five battalions) as well as boost Psychological 
Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel (a 33% increase). He also ordered the 
creation of a Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) composed of 2,600 
Marines and Navy personnel to train foreign military units and conduct direct action and special 
reconnaissance. SEAL Teams were ordered to increase manning levels to conduct direct action 
missions, and a SOF unmanned aerial vehicle squadron was created. SOF was growing 
exponentially in response to the IW mission requirement and policy was being changed under 
Rumsfeld’s direction.128 
Michael Vickers was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC, who performs service Secretary-like duties over USSOCOM, as 
would the Secretary of the Army over the US Army). Vickers took this guidance and worked to 
establish DOD Directive 3000.07 (IW). After the 2006 QDR, the military services were required 
to plan (but not execute) for implementation of an IW capability. The lack of DOD commitment 
(reminiscent of the lackluster efforts tied to Operation Eagle Claw) combined with the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC) request that Vickers testify as to progress in IW capabilities 
and capacity compelled him into action. Vickers partnered with USSOCOM commander 
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III. EFFECTS ON AMERICAN SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES 
Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations notes that:  
SOF are selected, trained, and equipped to conduct all forms of IW. Special 
operations considers the totality of the cognitive, informational, physical, cultural, 
and social aspects of the operational environment to influence the local 
population’s behavior through unique capabilities to identify and influence 
relevant populations, enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, 
fight and defeat adversaries.130 
 
The clear and obvious bias to SOF conducting IW is to be expected: four of the five doctrinal 
missions (UW, FID, COIN, and CT) under the IW umbrella are SOF Core Missions.131 However 
20 years of continuous war have left America’s SOF brittle, exposed and vulnerable in many 
ways, as noted by the Congressional Research Center: 
…three legislative provisions call for ASD SOLIC and USSOCOM… to take an 
introspective look at U.S. SOF’s culture, roles and responsibilities, adequacy of 
resources, organizational structure, and the adequacy of training, education, and 
personnel. Some have suggested these provisions are a precursor for 
congressional and DOD actions to “rein in and reorient” U.S. SOF from fighting 
terrorists to taking on nation-states instead. Others, citing reportedly 
nonsanctioned (sic) military combat operations in Africa, where U.S. SOF are 
said to have strayed from their train and assist mandate, have questioned whether 
or not U.S. SOF was involved in direct combat in Niger. Some believe this 
situation calls into question the adequacy of civilian oversight and control of U.S. 
SOF. Others assert that the size of U.S. SOF and the scope of their missions have 
expanded beyond the ability of USSOCOM to handle them and that congressional 
actions to increase ASD SOLIC oversight and control of U.S. SOF are necessary 
to improve the current state of affairs. Aware that U.S. SOF are overburdened and 
that there is a need to find the right balance between continuing to challenge 
terrorist organizations while simultaneously addressing growing irregular 
warfare threats posed by nation-states [emphasis is the author’s], policymakers 
will likely make good use of the two forthcoming congressionally mandated 
reviews. It is possible that over the next few years, significant public policy 
 





debates on the future of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF will be undertaken, potentially 
resulting in a number of changes for ASD SOLIC, USSOCOM, and U.S. SOF.132 
 
SOF by design are intended for ‘niche’ mission sets and not meant to be the main effort 
of a campaign plan. Special Operations are ‘often conducted in hostile, politically, and/or 
diplomatically sensitive environments… characterized by… time-sensitivity, clandestine or 
covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces… and a high degree of 
risk.’133 SOF elements are ‘specifically selected, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and 
support special operations.’134 As such, SOF elements are intended to provide high (strategic) 
return on investment for low (tactical) level opportunity cost.135 Put another way USSOCOM 
should deliver a full range of agile, flexible contingency responses through ‘innovative, low-cost, 
and small-footprint approaches…’136 
However, USSOCOM commander General Tony Thomas notes: ‘Special Operations 
Forces are the main effort, or major supporting effort for US VEO-focused operations in 
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq… essentially, everywhere Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria are to be found.’137 Which is to say, everywhere America is at war. Beyond the 2004 
designation of USSOCOM as global synchronizer and planner for counterterrorism, 2008 saw 
the command designated as the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
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synchronizing function in global training and assistance planning. In 2016, the Obama 
administration assigned USSOCOM the DOD lead effort to counter Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMDs), previously assigned to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). And 
in 2018, USSOCOM was designated to field a transregional Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO) capability to address the opportunities and risks of global information 
space.’138  
Two decades of combat as the main effort has had obvious – and very public – 
detrimental effects on USSOCOM’s small force. In light of several high-profile incidents 
ranging from the death of four Special Forces soldiers in Niger to the expulsion of an entire 
SEAL unit by Iraq’s operational commander, there is now no question that SOF has been pushed 
too far.139 As noted in the USA Today, ‘Degradation of these forces is a national security 
problem we ignore at our own peril.’140 The USSOCOM commander directed a comprehensive 
review of SOF culture and ethics which found that causal factors across all incidents of 
misconduct were: 
…SOF culture overly focused on employment and mission accomplishment to the 
detriment of leadership, discipline, and accountability… additional concerns 
regarding the selection of SOF personnel (military, civilian, contractors) selected 
to fill assessment, selection, and initial training roles, and whether they 
demonstrated the appropriate balance of character and competence for these 
tasks… the creation of ad hoc SOF command and control structures to support the 
bias towards force employment increases the demand for rank-appropriate leaders 
to staff those structures, resulting in command teams (O-5 and O-6 commanders 
and their senior enlisted leaders) [Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels as well as 
their Command Sergeants Major] and key staff being absent from their units and 
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responsibilities while their units are preparing for operational deployment… 
current employment models disrupt purpose-built teams, consume leadership 
capacity, and impact individual predictability… support of ad hoc requirements 
contributes to the slow erosion of leadership, discipline and accountability and the 
habitual breaking apart of SOF units to meet demands strains effective present 
and engaged leadership.141 
 
On paper, the shift from IW to a GPC scenario would look like a needed and welcome 
break for USSOCOM. It is temptingly simple to conceive of IW as a distractor to addressing 
near-peer competitors: ‘Simply put, we took our eye off of the biggest threats in favor of the 
closest threats… In many cases we haven’t looked at these things very deeply as they simply 
weren’t the 25 meter targets. Now they are.’142 However, the advent of GPC is seen by most to 
merely continue the IW context of competition below traditional warfare’s levels of conflict. 
Should this be accurate it can only bode ill for USSOCOM, already struggling to self-correct 
after two decades at war.  
This author was recently asked by a retired Special Forces General for an opinion on 
what was wrong with USSOCOM and SOF culture. The reply:  
1. SOF has become the default answer for policy makers – the ‘Easy’ button, 
2. SOF has, as a result of number 1, become the Main Effort for the GWOT, and 
3. SECDEF Rumsfeld’s requirement to grow SOF immediately, in direct violation of policy 
and doctrine, resulted in poorly trained, vetted, and acclimated operators within SOF who 
have sullied the reputation of the command.143  
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SOF has borne out these effects while being the de facto IW force, when clearly it is not 
equipped to operate as a main effort: it is a niche element. This over-extension of an elite unit is 
reminiscent of the French Paras in Algeria:  
The media hailed the audacious paras as heroes of the war. In the battles against 
the moujahidine, the paras proved to be hard-charging, shock troops, pursuing the 
moujahidine into their sanctuaries. Even “politicians of the Left entrusted these 
same soldiers with exorbitant powers” on the basis of their celebrity. Although the 
paras numbered less than 5% of the 400,000-man French force, they did most of 
the fighting and their notoriety was not undeserved. Journalist A. P. Lentin wrote 
that the paras “represented the quintessence of basic courage and deadly 
efficiency in the service of the maintenance of order.” From the perspective of the 
European citizens on the streets of Algiers, they were demi-gods who could do no 
wrong —and those can be the worst kind of soldier.144 
 
The use of SOF as the IW practitioner may pass the test in a CT setting, but for most IW it 
represents a broken logic; SOF as an element was designed to operate in small numbers with a 
limited and sometimes non-existent footprint. Insurgency, Stability operations and FID have 
been calculated by the DOD to require exceptionally large numbers of troops: 
In Bosnia… the Pentagon had used a formula of one soldier for every 50 
Bosnians. In Iraq that calculation added up to 300,000 troops. The Defense 
Department countered Shinseki by saying that Iraq was very different from 
Bosnia when it came to troop needs. "There has been none of the record in Iraq of 
ethnic militias fighting one another that produced so much bloodshed and 
permanent scars in Bosnia, along with a continuing requirement for large 
peacekeeping forces to separate those militias," Wolfowitz insisted.145 
 
Wolfowitz was ironically prescient in his denial, citing the need for peacekeeping forces 
to deal with militias. Traditional warfare thinking insists there will be no aftermath or guerrilla 
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activity, and the populace simply rolls over to accept their liberators without objection. 
Meanwhile the DOD has opted to extract itself from both long-term deployments and the IW 
methodology itself by placing the IW mission set on a force not properly aligned to it. The 
results have been unforgiving and lethal. US policy makers have leaned heavily on the 
USSOCOM enterprise over the course of two decades in what might well be deemed a 
continuance of the ‘Cult of the Operator’ mentality.146 Indeed, SOF frequently have found 
themselves serving as the ‘Exit Strategy.’ 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The effect of poor American IW strategy on policy and practitioners has been to blind the 
USG on critical matters such as budgets and operational effects. This has rendered America 
poorly enabled to execute IW, its most ubiquitous mode of conflict. Similar to the post-Vietnam 
era, shifting the impetus away from IW to Multi-Domain Operations must be considered a shift 
back to traditional warfare by the conventional forces for what may be less than appropriate 
reasons. Jones suggests that ‘this may be, in part, because the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and 
Marine Corps would prefer to spend their procurement dollars on big-ticket items like strategic 
bombers, stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, guided-missile destroyers and nuclear-powered attack 
submarines that are primarily designed for conventional or nuclear war.’147 Soaring defense 
budgets appear particularly tone-deaf in the age of the Corona virus ravaging America and the 
world. It’s been known for some time that infectious diseases pose both national and global 
threats: the number of new diseases discovered per decade has increased four-fold since 1960 
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and the number of outbreaks per year has tripled since 1980.148 Meanwhile, the nuclear triad of 
bombers, submarines and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can easily go without the 
suggested upgrade of ICBMs and still maintain the deterrent and retaliation capability needed.149 
President Trump’s desired increase of 20% in nuclear weaponry budgets in the face of proposed 
budget cuts to the Centers for Disease Control, World Health Organization and other public 
health agencies reveals ignorance (or lack of concern) regarding our true security threats.150 
Another disturbing possibility is that the parochialism that derailed IW and SOF in 
previous decades is still at large in the DOD. It is worth noting that America’s defense budget is 
larger than that of the next eleven countries in the world combined.151 Hoffman noted of the US 
Navy in 2006:  
By 2011, the carrier fleet will be able to strike over 10,000 targets a day. The 
battle line will grow to 84 ships, carrying nearly 9,000 battle force missiles. The 
SSN (nuclear-powered attack submarine) force will be joined by four capacious 
SSGNs (nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines); when they do, the battle 
force will have 1,000 covert vertical-launch system cells capable of firing a land-
attack missile. If anything, the fleet has too much usable strike capacity, paid for 
at the expense of other important capabilities, such as expeditionary maneuver 
and combat logistics (emphasis is the author’s).152 
 
Groupthink is another possibility based on military organizations, and even SOF is 
embracing the US Army’s Multi-Domain Operations.153 The US Army’s conception of IW 
remains anchored in Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and advisory missions that have proven 
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questionable at best, while the Irregular Warfare Center has been closed since 2014.154 In frank 
terms, the DOD did not want IW or SOF, and has imposed the mission set it did not choose to 
recognize onto the force it did not choose to create. Ucko is unflinching in his assessment: ‘The 
US Army must question what force is needed for 21st century threats… Its plea for relevance 
now rests on the jargon of “multidomain battle” … Seldom has so much jargon been deployed to 
say so little, but one thing is clear: counterinsurgency is out.’155  
The evidence is plentiful: only one Professional Military Education (PME) institution 
teaches IW – the Naval Post-Graduate School, predominantly attended by SOF officers. There is 
no corollary agency to the National Counterterrorism Center to address IW at the interagency 
level of policy, once again demonstrating bias for kinetic response. PME taught in other 
institutions has meanwhile shifted to teaching traditional and nuclear warfare.156  
Practitioners realize America is under threat; it is generally accepted that GPC is once 
again taking place, and America’s new concept of Deterrence by Denial is designed to address 
the GPC environment (replacing the war-on-two-fronts model known as All Domain 
Dominance).157  This dynamic is captured in the National Security Strategy, which notes: 
 The United States must consider what is enduring about the problems we face, 
and what is new… Since the 1990s, the United States displayed a great degree of 
strategic complacency. We assumed that our military superiority was guaranteed 
and that a democratic peace was inevitable… In addition, after being dismissed as 
a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and 
Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are 
fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis 
and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during 
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peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to 
change the international order in their favor.158 
 
However, logic demands that we address the threat as it is, not as we choose to envision 
it. Successful deterrence and denial in America’s campaign plan will only result in a continued 
status quo.  Traditional warfare as a mode of combat is the least likely course of action for an 
American opponent, be they state or non-state actors. The use of IW by a near-peer competitor 
would enable more than victory. It would exploit the Westphalian system for legitimacy within 
the community of nations. Virtually all nations, regardless of actual actions and intent (vis-à-vis 
colonialism, oppression, or genocide), will attempt to craft a message that displays acceptable 
levels of both righteousness and morality. In the case of Syria, Assad still maintained the status 
of a sovereign head of state, and used this position to continue a presence in the United Nations 
even in the light of brutal oppression of what began as peaceful uprisings.159 This pretense 
slowed response and bred confusion while oppressing and abusing his own populace. By 
contrast, America adheres to Westphalian politics, which, in conjunction with the post-colonial 
system, demands that ongoing political models eschew seizure or capture of land from other 
countries. Per Clausewitz: ‘War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a 
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.’160 As such, the 
capture of enemy objectives is the least likely mission based on doctrine.  
IW has been and will continue to be executed as warfare of choice by adversaries who 
cannot justify losing in traditional warfare or executed as warfare of necessity by those who 
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cannot address the US overmatch in defense posture. In The Rise of the Present Unconventional 
Character of Warfare this is driven home:  
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated reliance on a massive but minimally trained 
army was insufficient against highly-trained forces with advanced weaponry… 
U.S. operations against Somali warlords demonstrated technological military 
advantage could be mitigated by irregular warfare… The West has obtained a 
credible conventional deterrent that adversaries would be lunatic to challenge. If 
the United States and NATO maintain superior military capabilities [the intent of 
GPC funding models], adversaries will avoid traditional conventional conflict.161 
 
Max Boot updates the maxim of American dominance in traditional warfare to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, noting: ‘Given the United States' demonstrations of its mastery of conventional combat 
in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, few adversaries in the future will be foolish enough to put tank armies 
in the desert against an American force.’162 Iran, Russia, and Pakistan have backed the Taliban as 
a proxy force and they have fought America to a stalemate that ended at the negotiation table, not 
the signing of formal surrender documents.163 Policy makers must once again step in to ensure 
doctrine is followed by the military to secure American interests and popular sentiment through 
the use of IW.  
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Chapter 2 – Be the Change you 
Wish to See in the World 
 
 
Can IW tactics dictate the outcome of these military campaigns in place of a true 
strategy? The second chapter of this thesis will discuss IW and how it has shaped outcomes 
through the context of insurgency, terrorism, and VEOs. VEOs are noted as one of the threats in 
the NDS, and their use of insurgency and terror is not new. As the two dominant IW tactics, 
insurgency has received very different responses than terrorism. This may be a matter of context 
more than anything else. The definition of terrorism has been re-hashed, re-visited, and 
continually rebuffed to the point that it is virtually an endless argument. Numerous authors have 
identified critical components of the rhetoric, context, and history associated with the term. At 
the end of the discussion there are few points agreed upon, thus giving terrorism another 
deliberate treatment would unnecessarily lengthen this paper. As such this paper will discuss the 
subject using the guidelines identified by Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger and Polina Beliakova 




Actors. They essentially boil down the problem to one of insurgency, which is disturbing given 
America’s preference for kinetic CT operations and abandonment of COIN.164 
Insurgents use terrorism as a tool to capture the imagination of those they need to impress 
with the importance of their struggle. Propaganda, demonstrations, political mobilization of the 
populace, subversion, insurrection, guerilla warfare and conventional warfare are other TTPs 
cited.165 The point of terrorism as defined by Moghadam, et al, is that guerilla warfare or 
insurgent operations target uniformed forces of the opposition, while terrorism is used to target 
civilians or those not engaged in combat, for the express purpose of spectacle and psychological 
impact.166 
This chapter examines two case studies: the first is Algeria as an insurgency. It addresses 
the shift between IW and traditional warfare, tactical innovation as faux strategy and policy 
failure through half-measures. The second case study is the terrorism of the PLO. It addresses the 
PLO’s global effects on military operations and vast networks established in their terror 
campaign. Finally, this chapter examines the failure to address ideology and how doctrine has 
evolved almost by default in dealing with VEOs. In conclusion this chapter provides policy 
recommendations as well as a theory development concept based on current IW definitions, and 
recommends that ideology and doctrine must be addressed without false labels. 
I. INSURGENCY: ALGERIA 
The Algerian revolution meets the criteria of insurgency for the purposes of this paper in 
the literature. Algeria’s insurrection is outlined as a critical point in both Algerian and French 
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history and cited as a classic example of insurgency owing specifically to its colonial aspect.167 
Indeed, groups as diverse as the Black Panthers, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the 
Weather Underground, the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the Tamil Tigers, as 
well as numerous state military elements, are known to have screened The Battle of Algiers for 
its insight into insurgent warfare.168  
Algeria was a holdover of the Imperial Age of European Colonization and France 
brutally abused the Algerians both politically and economically, despite their having 
incorporated Algeria into France. French colonists owned the vast majority of property in 
Algeria and dominated the Algerian political scene. Algerians on the other hand paid 70% of all 
taxes while only earning 20% of the national income in 1954. Only after four years of warfare 
and the election of Charles De Gaulle in 1958 did Algerians first receive the right to vote in 
French elections, even though official French policy was that ‘Algeria is France.’169 
Such abuse was mild compared to that meted out by the French military throughout the 
19th century however, when atrocities such as massacres of indigenous people occurred. One 
such incident was the killing of 500 people in the caves surrounding the town of Dahra.170 With 
such history the presence of subversives in both Algeria and mainland France throughout the 20th 
century is unsurprising; however, it is generally left uncovered in literature. The Etoile Nord-
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Africain (ENA) was founded in 1926 after the first World War and serves as an excellent 
example of how social movements in the populace spread across mainland France amidst 
increasing discontent in the Algerian population.171 
Terrorism was plentiful and used by virtually every party in this campaign. The initial 
attacks launched by the Front de Liberation National (FLN) failed to inspire the support of the 
indigenous people of Algeria. The FLN prodded them on to submission and compliance by 
attacking Muslims who aided or worked for European settlers, attacking the French security 
apparatus, and randomly assassinating settlers.172 Further, the European settlers later succumbed 
to the concept of vigilante justice and attacked countless Muslim Algerians. And the French 
Army carried out a well-documented campaign of torture, including beatings, drownings, and 
executions.173 Algerian-born French Nobel Prize winner Albert Camus famously noted: 
We ought to condemn with equal force and in the bluntest of terms the terrorism 
practiced by the FLN against French civilians and, even more frequently, Arab 
civilians. This terrorism is a crime, which can be neither excused or allowed to 
develop. In the form in which it is currently practiced, no revolutionary movement 
has ever tolerated it, and the Russian terrorists of 1905 would sooner have died 
(as they proved) than to stoop to such tactics. It is wrong to transform the 
injustices endured by the Arab people into a systematic indulgence of those who 
indiscriminately murder Arab and French civilians without regard to age or sex.174 
 
The use of propaganda by the FLN was clearly effective, and Galula specifies that their 
use of it far surpassed that of the French counterinsurgency effort.175 The long-festering 
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Algerian-born population of migrant workers in France were targeted by pro-Algerian 
propaganda – cafes and hotels were commonly canvassed to round up support.176 Likewise the 
global media served to spread pro-Algerian propaganda; the sight of atrocities committed, 
including wounded women and children in the world news, served as fodder for the global 
outrage over suppression of the colony’s freedoms.177 One famous literary patron was Germaine 
Tillion, a French ethnologist well-acquainted with Algeria. Having served as a Resistance fighter 
for the French in WWII, her pedigree and voice were a damning indictment of the position of the 
French. She wrote of her meetings with Saadi Yacef in her book Les Ennemis Complémentaires, 
detailing how she had convinced the FLN leader to declare a cease fire out of compassion for the 
wounded.178 Similar propaganda victories were in short supply for the French. 
Demonstrations became commonplace both in France and Algeria, as people rallied on 
both sides of the cause. In France, the Algerian-born migrant population supported their 
homeland marching in crowds up to 14,000-strong.179 French clergy and academia spoke up as 
well, waging letter-writing campaigns.180 On the other side of the conflict, Algeria suffered riots 
by European colonists protesting the French departure from Algeria estimated to be 30,000-
strong.181  
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While subversion of the French rule of Algeria proper is an important discussion, what is 
less obvious is the subversion of French rule within its own borders. Algerian migrant 
populations were kept hidden from government social systems that served both overt French 
administrative purposes and also covertly tracked the migrants. Welfare, medical, pensions, and 
housing services offered by traditional French agencies were nullified by the establishment of 
‘shadow’ government efforts of the FLN. By providing these services through their own network 
of commercial shop-owners and hoteliers (all sympathetic to the Algerian cause, by natural or 
artificial inclination) the FLN both obscured their people and networks and acted in the place of 
the French government, securing their authority to the populace.182 As Bernard B. Fall observed 
‘when a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered (sic).’183  
It is a short leap from subversion to insurrection, and having had decades to foment 
feelings of rebellion, the movement took life in 1954. By means of both guerilla and 
conventional warfare, the FLN brought the fight to the French. As an insurgency movement, the 
FLN utilized the pre-existing social and commercial networks of Algerian dissidents in France to 
create a political mobilization of the populace with masterful effect. Since World War I, there 
were a large number of Algerian migrants in France who were dissatisfied with the status quo, 
but the FLN didn’t rest there. By targeting ‘neutral’ Algerian business owners in France and then 
intimidating them into submission, they added these numbers to those already supporting the 
rebellion. Injecting their brand of political activism into a well-established fringe population 
within metropolitan French cities allowed for recruiting of fighters, essentially mirroring today’s 
Foreign Fighter networks by mobilizing these supporters to execute their missions. It also 
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increased financial and logistical support and provided a form of safe-haven for rest and 
recuperation away from the established battleground as an External Haven.184 
a. TACTICAL SHIFTS: ALL WARFARE IS HYBRID 
In the Algerian campaign, the discussion of advanced TTPs centers around the French. 
Numerous instances of cross-border operations by the FLN serve as an example of guerilla 
warfare. When the FLN sought refuge in neighboring countries it led to the development of an 
effective TTP by the French, one reminiscent of the Warsaw Ghetto. Walling off an entire border 
is clearly a topic of interest today seen in both Israel and American political debates. The Morice 
Line, as it was called, was the French answer to border control. It served as a hardening of 
defenses along the Algerian border, which led to an interesting turn of events. In a tribute to its 
effectiveness, it trapped Algerian sympathizers in Tunisia. The FLN then transitioned from IW to 
traditional warfare, launching a failed campaign to breach the wall from March to May of 1958. 
The casualties suffered were 3,000 and the remaining 20,000 fighters were left to sit out the 
conflict until the completion of the war.185 
The FLN used Algerian social and commercial networks in mainland France (referred to 
today as Human Terrain) to subvert government services and increase the mobility of rebels from 
Europe to Africa (similar to today’s migration issues). In response the French seized upon a TTP 
that had been used in Europe previously as a means of census recording. Since the 1890s (quite 
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clearly in response to the Anarchist campaign that fatally claimed the lives of multiple heads of 
state during the same time-frame) punch-card machines had been used to track large groups of 
people such as in a census or for large demographic criteria.186 The IBM punch-card machines 
used to collate this data were now geared towards profiling of terror suspects and proved a 
significant tool to the police intelligence functions.  
Dossiers were compiled on individuals with varying degrees of success, but this clearly 
laid the path for many of today’s tools such as biometrics, battlefield DNA collection and 
identification, and forensic analysis. The Berillon system recorded numerous points, both 
demographic and biometric, to include: physiological measurements, photographs, fingerprints, 
gender, age, marriage status, literacy, housing, rent, and wages. Such actions were a natural 
response to the exploitation of the migrant populace’s ability to drift from job to job and 
maintain anonymity.187 
Further TTP advances in responding to the Algerian terror threat were more tactical in 
nature. So successful were the helicopter warfare advances pioneered by the French that they 
directly influenced the operational design of the United States military effort in Vietnam, which 
then propagated globally to become accepted doctrine.188 Helicopter warfare was first devised 
and operationally tested in Indochina by the French as they utilized various airframes for logistic 
and medical operations. However, in Algeria they advanced the concept; Colonel Felix Brunet is 
credited with the first instance of arming a helicopter for use as a gunship. In 1955, French 
troops were pinned down by rebels in the Atala Mountain range south of Algiers; Brunet placed 
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a machine-gunner in each casualty transport pod of a Bell H-47 helicopter. The fire delivered 
from the aerial vantage point of the aircraft allowed for French troops, who had been pinned 
down by rebels firing from an elevated position, to dislodge them and move on to their 
objective.189 Similarly, the French went on to utilize advanced air combat TTPs such as Close 
Air Support (CAS) to crush the rebels again and again tactically.190 Notably, these tactical 
advances delivered the victory in battle but gave no advantage to the French’s strategic position 
in global politics. 
b. POLICY OVERREACH WITHOUT THE FULL INTENT TO EXECUTE THE 
MISSION 
The previous decades had ravaged the morale and esprit de corps of the French Army, 
having suffered brutal losses in Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia and the Suez Canal.191 The French 
forces were fresh out of their routing in Indochina. Schrepel notes: 
The Indochina War (1946–1954) created a watershed within the professional 
army. The burden for the war increasingly fell on the shoulders of the few. The 
paratroops—or “paras” as they were called—became the army’s most reliable, 
crack troops. In many a battle, paratroop units fought outnumbered in the war’s 
sharpest fighting. The pivotal battle of Dienbienphu (Sic) (1953–1954) 
epitomized their skill and sacrifice. In 1954, the theater commander dropped 
airborne battalions into a Vietnamese jungle valley. For 7 months, they stood 
alone against greatly superior numbers, only to be abandoned and crushed during 
weeks of grueling siege warfare.192 
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The Paras, in particular, suffered the surrender of 11,000 troops following the defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu; of these only 3,290 returned from the Communist prison camps where they were 
tortured and re-educated.193 It goes without saying that these men should not have been sent 
back to combat, however these same men were sent to Algeria and proved to be adept students of 
their Viet Minh cadre. Paul Teitgen was a local official in Algeria who’d survived Dachau and 
noted on detainees of the French ‘profound traces of the cruelty and tortures that I had personally 
suffered fourteen years ago in the Gestapo cellars.’194 The tactical success of saving the capital 
city of Algiers was delivered by the Paras, and largely built upon intelligence gained by such 
torture. These revelations revulsed the world and eroded any remaining support for France, 
prompting Teitgen to remark ‘All right, [10th Para Division Commander, Major General Jacques] 
Massu won the Battle of Algiers, but that meant losing the war.’195 
During the period immediately following WWII and through the Indochina War, the 
Communists and Socialists were major French political parties. They actively undermined the 
Indochina War effort, hoping instead to enjoy a peace dividend.196 They were openly and 
aggressively antagonistic to the French military, denouncing them as ‘war criminals,’ using labor 
unions to conduct sabotage, and sowing discord. The French public took this to heart with 
protests and boycotts; for example, civilian blood banks would not donate to the military.197 
Schrepel elaborates how these effects carried over into the Algerian effort: 
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…the Mendes-France (1954–1955) and Mollet governments (1956–1957) largely 
performed triage and could not remedy institutional weaknesses that had rendered 
the army technically, strategically, and morally unable to achieve national 
political objectives. In a nutshell, Paris committed the army to unwinnable wars in 
France’s name without providing the proper support to win and win with honor… 
the government took steps that slighted the army precisely at the time when Paris 
committed it to a period of continuous war from 1946–1962.198  
 
In the developing post-Colonial age, they were on the wrong side of history. France knew 
it and initially committed as little as possible to the effort, only clinging to Algeria out of their 
own battered sense of pride.199 Though they later succeeded tactically, they failed to grasp that 
the age of colonialism was over, and this strategic political truth overpowered any other 
operational or tactical consideration.200 
II. TERRORISM: PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION 
The second case study discusses the PLO and their use of terrorism. Per the criteria of 
insurgency for the purposes of this paper, there are some aspects that simply fail to be met. With 
both sides having used terror as a tool, it stands to reason that effective political strategies, more 
than tactical TTPs, were responsible for the end state. The Arabs utilized a losing strategy that 
saw them fighting against the tide of history, trying to denounce the victims of a recent globally 
known and acknowledged genocide. Unfortunately for the Palestinian Arabs, the world was more 
than happy to let the Israelis keep their land, and the Palestinian Arabs are effectively trapped in 
the ghettos of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  
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Palestine as a historic land was caught up in the last throes of European colonialism at the 
end of World War I. It was ruled by Turkey for hundreds of years, whose alliance with the losing 
Germans and Austro-Hungarians left Palestinian destiny unclear. France claimed the northern 
lands now known as Lebanon and Syria, but the area most clearly identified with modern 
Palestine fell to Britain, who had backed both the uprising of Arabs against their Turkish rulers 
and, counterintuitively, the return of Semitic peoples to Palestine.201 Thus, the stage was set for 
two diametrically opposed populations to vie for control of the land, virtually guaranteeing 
conflict, subversion, and guerilla warfare.  
From the earliest days, both forces embraced terrorism as a means to an end, with the 
elements in power having long history back to the days of Mandatory Palestine under British 
rule. Jews used the same tactics in Mandatory Palestine against the British as did the Palestinian 
Arabs, and to greater effect. Menachem Begin, Israeli Prime Minister from 1977-83, led the 
Irgun Zvai Le’umi (or National Military Organization), who bombed the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem during July of 1946 and hung two British Sergeants in July of 1947 while he was in 
command. They also conducted attacks against unarmed civilian populaces.202  
The brutal humiliation of four Arab nations (Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt) attacking and 
losing to the fledgling state of Israel a day after its declaration of statehood (May 14th, 1948) 
surely fueled bloodlust in Palestinian Arabs for decades. Following the victory of Israel in the 
1948 War, small-scale guerilla attacks by various factions became the norm until 1964. 203 
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Millions of Palestinian Arabs fled as refugees in the meantime, creating crisis events in 
surrounding countries, who then bore the burden of both the military loss and the human 
aftermath. It became politically problematic for these countries to openly acknowledge the 
Fedayeen, as these guerillas called themselves. With the creation of the PLO in 1964, there 
existed both a means to put a softer face on the Anti-Zionist movement and a means to unite the 
various parties fighting Israel.204 In this way their creation was terrorism but also directly tied to 
a political end state: the destruction of the Israeli state. Backed by the Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, creating the PLO served initially to bring Muslims in Israel into to the Pan-Arab 
movement.205 Egypt’s patronage would last for years, but eventually fail over time. 
The first armed wing of the PLO, known as the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), had a 
conventional Order of Battle (OB) built around artillery and tank units.206 By June of 1967 it 
became clear through the second large-scale defeat of Arab military forces by Israel that the PLO 
could not count on conventional warfare solutions to solve their problems. The Six-Day War 
resulted in Israel’s seizing the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
Peninsula.207 Further to this point, the PLO assessed that it would take years to match the tactical 
prowess of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Choosing IW, they used terrorism to raise finances, 
free prisoners, draw in recruits, and execute ‘Propaganda by Deed’ putting the Palestinian 
dilemma on the world stage.208 Moreover, in selecting terrorism and not insurgency, they 
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avoided the efforts required to conduct true guerilla warfare based on the populace as a center of 
gravity. The heavy lifting of prerequisite political, psychological and organizational preparation 
of a population not fully prepared to embrace the cause was evidently a bridge too far.209 This 
serves as a historical proof of concept for IW superseding traditional warfare when confronting a 
superior foe with an inferior force. 
However, 1967 also brought the opportunity to turn a tactical defeat into a propaganda 
victory. The March 21st battle at Karameh, a PLO-specific camp inside the borders of Jordan, 
allowed the PLO to claim that 300 Fatah fighters held off 15,000 IDF forces in a victory 
reminiscent of the Spartans at Thermopylae. Though this is a gross exaggeration, it did mark the 
first time the IDF and PLO clashed in conventional battle. That the IDF withdrew at nightfall 
after one day of fighting displayed a significant change in outcome from the hugely one-sided 
victory Israel had previously experienced. The point was not lost on a Palestinian Arab populace 
desperate for something to celebrate.210 
This propaganda victory provided secondary effects used by the PLO to justify their 
move to terror-based operations; as an example of both the recruitment benefits and the political 
mobilization of the population required for continued successes, 5,000 recruits joined Fatah after 
Karameh. This would repeat itself after the Munich attacks, with thousands recruited after that 
world-wide spectacle.211 The PLO would realize significant difficulty mobilizing support from 
their own populace within the occupied territories of Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights 
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and the West Bank. The refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan did maintain good support, 
however.212 
In 1968 the PLO made clear its transition to terror-based operations by electing a leader 
from the Fedayeen group known as Al Fatah. Mohammed ‘Yasser’ Arafat took control of the 
PLO and solidified the means of ‘armed struggle’ as the primary tool to achieve its end state. 
Likewise, the Palestine National Council (PNC) adopted a Palestinian National Charter in July 
1968 of which Article 10 stated that commando action to sustain guerilla operations was 
critical.213 For the next two decades the PLO would prove that terrorism was a viable tool in both 
military and political terms.214 
In terms of political subversion or insurrection the PLO was at best a mixed success and 
at worst a failure. The PLO’s general lack of structure beyond some cellular security-based 
requirements rendered them unable to manage their own forces, execute reliable command and 
control, or penetrate Israeli-occupied areas. They never overcame their factionalized origins and 
frequently served different Arab-state patrons while living in these host nations.215 Eventually, 
this failure of cohesive command and control led to the overthrow of the Palestinian Authority 
by Hamas in Gaza.216 
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The lack of cohesion serves as one reflection of leadership, while another is the reports of 
Arafat’s hoarding of wealth while he abandoned the people he claimed to champion.217 
Generally leadership was in short supply throughout Palestine’s campaign, as suggested by poor 
execution of doctrine. Bard O’Neill describes their efforts as a failed conceptualization of the 
military focused Cuban guerilla campaign, where party structure is developed after the guerilla 
campaign is launched (with the presumption being that the campaign becomes successfully self-
supportive, allowing space and time for the development of a political arm). O’Neill further 
suggests a reason for failure: the Palestinians didn’t grasp that Castro’s efforts against Batista 
pitted his guerillas against a weak political system, while the PLO faced a strong enemy with 
high morale in Israel.218 
a. THE PLO’S EFFECT ON GLOBAL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Two significant courses of action stand out in discussing advancements of TTPs executed 
by the PLO. The first is the revolutionary usage of hijacking in what is credited as the first 
modern act of terrorism.219 To be certain the PLO were not the only hijackers flying the 
unfriendly skies; from 1960 to 1972 approximately 17,000 US passengers and crew had been 
hijacked. 220 The PLO, however, found a way to politicize the act, and in doing so launched it 
into a higher realm of consequence. The hijacking of an Israeli El Al flight from Rome to Tel 
Aviv on July 22nd, 1968, by Palestinians of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP, a PLO-aligned group) marked the first time an organization had hijacked across 
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international borders for political means instead of standard money-driven air piracy.221 This plot 
quickly illustrated the danger of hosting the PLO in one’s country however, as the Israelis 
destroyed 13 planes in the Beirut airport as retaliation for El Al hijackings.222  
The second significant course of action in advancing TTPs was the first globally 
broadcasted terror event in history; an estimated 900 million people watched the massacre at the 
Munich Olympics on TV in 1972.223 It was the first return of the Olympics to Germany since the 
Nazi regime hosted the 1936 Olympics, and security was intentionally side-lined in favor of a 
carefree bohemian feel to appeal to the masses.224 The Black September Organization, a covert 
arm of Arafat’s Al Fatah within the PLO, had little trouble penetrating the low-security Olympic 
village.225 They even received a guided tour of team housing by an Israeli athlete and had help 
carrying in their guns and ammunition by an American athlete.226 
Munich’s security footing stands in stark contrast to today’s environment, but even then, 
the entire attack was predicted nearly to the letter, as recounted in chilling detail by Graff in The 
Threat Matrix: 
…Dr. Georg Sieber, a West German police psychologist, had walked through 
twenty-six different scenarios for possible trouble. Situation 21 had focused on 
Palestinian terrorists storming the Israeli compound, killing hostages, and 
demanding the release of their counterparts in Israeli jails and a plane to make 
their escape to an Arab country.227 
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The resulting debacle pitted untrained police hunting enthusiasts with personal weapons 
from home against terrorists with explosives and AK-47s. The untrained volunteer assault force 
abandoned the mission before arriving at their objective, leaving police marksmen (the 
aforementioned hunters with personal rifles) to deal with a contingency that was almost certainly 
not in the plan. Nine Israeli athletes and four Palestinian terrorists died at the end of the 20-hour 
disaster, and governments around the world collectively realized two things: first, they too had 
exactly zero response prepared for such an event.228 Second, going forward there must be a plan 
in place to respond to such an attack.  
In the aftermath, the West Germans quickly moved to establish Grenzschutzgruppe Neun 
(GSG-9)229; the French followed suit with Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(GIGN)230, and Britain re-missioned Special Air Service (SAS) troops to respond to CT crises. 
All would be readily employed in short order.231  
The US response was predictably complex. As the previous entries mention, these were 
primarily police elements to handle interior threats to citizenry. Likewise, the US had established 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams in metropolitan and urban centers, with the Los 
Angeles Police Departments considered to be the originator of the concept in 1967 as a response 
to the Watts riots.232 Owing to the size of the US, it is obvious that a single national element 
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would be hard pressed at best to respond to anything but the most exceptional crisis. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team (FBI HRT) was developed after the Hanafi 
Muslim sect took over the Washington DC city hall in 1977.233 FBI leadership assessed their 
options after the event, including usage of SFOD-D which had been working towards achieving 
Full Operational Capability all the while. Delta was seen as being entirely combat oriented and 
unlikely to succeed in an arrest warrant scenario (where suspects retain protection under the US 
Constitution), and presented further challenges related to the Posse Comitatus act. It was these 
points that resulted in the HRT being stood up (with direct input by Colonel Charles Beckwith, 
the principal architect of Delta Force). Thus, the highly specialized FBI HRT handles internal 
hostage scenarios on US soil, while the SFOD-D responds to American hostage scenarios 
overseas. The US Navy Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, commonly known as 
SEAL Team Six) was created later in the 1980s, with an initial mission set of hostage rescue 
specific to underway vessels at sea.234 
What becomes clear upon analyzing the cause and effect in play, is that the advancement 
and brinksmanship of terror tactics executed by the PLO and their various organizations pushed 
the world to a new level of response in CT operations. It is difficult to overstate the importance 
of this point – the twin courses of action, political weaponization of hijacking and spectacle-
based political murder on mass media (making the terrorist label somewhat superfluous) changed 
the operational environment forever. The American CT units (that in part or in whole exist owing 
to US responses to these actions) have reshaped America’s entire DOD methodology in 21st 
century combat. No facet of combat operations is untouched by the TTPs, Research and 
 





Development (R&D), Logistics, Acquisition, and Joint Operations models shaped by the 
successes enjoyed by these CT elements. Individuals (not just organizations or nation-states) are 
now targeted effectively, lethally, and globally via drone strikes built upon entire networks of 
intelligence collection operating in near-real time… all of which grew out of the response to 
terrorism discussed here. Such massive investment of time and money demands a return, and as 
such the American DOD bias towards kinetic response is not surprising.  
It is noteworthy that the Black September Organization claim the Munich attack as a 
success, and as previously discussed, the propaganda value was undeniable in both publicity and 
recruitment value. Politically speaking it is assessed by scholars to be successful as well, in that 
no more than two years later Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly. Shortly 
following the PLO was granted ‘Special Observer’ status by the UN. No less than 86 countries 
established political relations with the PLO during the 1970s.235 Of course there is no hard and 
fast evidence that the PLO achieved these goals by virtue of their terrorism, as the UN certainly 
couldn’t admit to that, but the effect is undeniable. 
But if it is that politics, not tactical victories, more frequently decides winners and losers 
in conflicts, then surely it was not the PLO’s terrorism that won the day for them. Their 
advanced TTPs drove development of CT elements that have wrought havoc for decades upon 
terror networks globally (including their own), but still their political efforts prospered. That 
said, if the PLO roundly deny that they were a terror organization, then their efforts and 
achievements must not be acknowledged as a result of their terror-based actions. This is losing 
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the battle of propaganda. Their mastery of IW, however, provides numerous examples to learn 
from.  
b. THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY  
Perhaps the most critical piece of the discussion is the legacy and future of the Palestinian 
terrorists. They served as a beacon to others that violence is not just acceptable but rewarded in 
international politics. Numerous secular, ethnic, and religious movements looked to them for 
examples of success. They are now known to have ‘created an extensive transnational extremist 
network -- tied into which were various state sponsors such as the Soviet Union, certain Arab 
states, as well as traditional criminal organizations. By the end of the 1970s, the Palestinian 
secular network was a major channel for the spread of terrorist techniques worldwide.’236 
Beyond carrying out terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Western Europe, the PLO (through 
Al Fatah) is known to have offered training in terrorist TTPs to a large swath of terrorists and 
insurgents across Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East.237 Hoffman notes that at least 40 
different terrorist groups were trained by the PLO and adds North America as a point of origin; 
the PLO charged between $5-10k for a six week course of training, and became one of the first 
terrorist groups to accumulate such wealth.238 
In light of this networking of nefarious actors, it is no surprise that there are common 
threads running through both the Algerian and PLO scenarios which have since come to light. 
One is Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Pan-Arab nationalist president of Egypt. After the 1946 failure 
of the first band of Algerian rebels, Nasser gave them refuge in Egypt where they became 
 
236 John Moore, ‘The Evolution of Islamic Terror: An Overview,’ Frontline-Target America, Public Broadcast 
Service, accessed July 20th, 2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html. 
237 Ibid. 




members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 239 Nasser inspired the creation and rebellion of the FLN, 
an amalgamation of Algerian rebel elements, and he must certainly have seen the same 
possibilities in the PLO’s mix of Palestinian insurgent elements.240 He served as the primary 
patron of the PLO from their inception and for many years. Algeria also provided training to Al-
Fatah, which joined the PLO and was led by Arafat, who ultimately took over leadership of the 
PLO.241 
The other linkage between the two groups is Communism, with China and the USSR 
specifically acting as patron states in the IW problem set. Ho Chi Minh, who defeated the French 
with his Viet Minh, is known to have been in close contact with the Chinese Communists both 
before and after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defeated the Nationalists. Ho (whose real 
name was Nguyen Ai Quoc) had in fact been previously trained in the Soviet Union and was a 
long-time Communist.242 The Chinese and Viet Minh routinely exchanged weapons, money, 
entire troop formations, officers, and importantly intelligence collection TTPs from 1945-49.243 
Thus it was that the TTPs of IW, and notably torture, passed from Chinese and Viet Minh 
Communists to the French through the brutal education of warfare. The French survivors of the 
Viet Minh prison camps passed it on to the Algerians.  
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The Chinese also sponsored the PLO, providing doctrine, weapons, money and officer 
exchanges. Haaretz reported that ‘by 1967, the Palestinians were seemingly fighting almost 
exclusively with Chinese-made weaponry.’ Chinese support of the Palestinian cause pre-dates 
the PLO; they sent financial aid via Syria for refugees in 1960, as their first attempt to engage the 
Palestinian people. Chinese media also showed a marked increase in support following the first 
Arab League summit in1964.244 By 1968 PLO guerrillas were being trained in China, and 
Chinese weapons were shipped to their camps. By 1970 Arafat had flown to visit China and 
North Vietnam in search of funding and patronage (which he received, as did Muammar 
Gaddafi’s Libyan terror enterprise, whose representative was on the same airplane as Arafat).245  
The PLO insisted upon the leeway to entertain relations with both major Communist 
superpowers, which they achieved.246 The Soviet Union sponsored the PLO once Yuri Andropov 
took power in 1967.247  
The French fought Vietnamese Communists and lost as did America. This is all the more 
noteworthy because Ho served as a recruited agent of the American Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS – precursor to the CIA) during WWII, as did several of his lieutenants.248 One wonders if 
this information was available to General Westmoreland, who famously ignored the French IW 
experience in Indochina and Algeria (excepting certain tactical elements such as helicopter 
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warfare) and then repeated their failures in Vietnam.249 Some lessons of the French ring true 
through history, such as when General Navarre requested 50,000 troops for Algeria but was 
given only 20,000. This mirrors General Shenseki’s experience in determining US troop strength 
for the Iraq invasion of 2003; he sought at least 300,000 but Rumsfeld opted for 145,000.250 
Such policy overreach without the full intent to execute the mission is a frequent hallmark of 
failure in IW. 
Even after Vietnam the American DOD ignored IW until forced to address it (Munich), 
but overwhelmingly leaned to the kinetic, CT side of the terrorism problem set for its appeal as a 
quick and politically-spectacular solution more suitable to American doctrine. This policy failed 
to address the issues that keep people coming back to violence as a valid choice. As pointed out 
in West Point’s IW podcast, tactical successes that achieve short-term security and stability do 
not equate to geo-political strategic success that maintains long-term peace.251 In the 21st 
century, non-state actors have found a way to exploit this.  
III. IDEOLOGY AND DOCTRINE 
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) are the only non-state threat included in the 
NDS. The choice to use the word extremist is curious, as terrorism is already a perfectly good, 
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poorly defined word available for use. Indeed, any number of words could have been substituted: 
guerrilla, insurgent, rebel, etc… 
Non-state actors (NSAs) have been known threats for decades, regardless of any claims 
to the contrary. As depicted in this paper, the PLO, Algerian rebels, and many more have been 
both hunted and courted by state actors throughout history. Numerous other authors have treated 
this subject, but another lens of examination is more critical: ideology. Ideology is to the 
Irregular Warrior as doctrine is to the military. It carries the specific aspect of being actionable 
by the adherent, guiding their beliefs but also their employment.252 Thus, if one’s ideology 
includes Jihad, certainly one can be expected to act on this imperative. Ideology and doctrine tell 
us who one is and why one acts; using a study of ideology (or doctrine) there is a baseline of how 
one’s culture may choose to advance, operationally or otherwise.  
There remains an inherent problem with the term VEO – though it is not inaccurate, 
neither is it accurate enough. Adherents to any number of belief systems may be deemed 
extremists. Extremism cannot stand the scrutiny of being defined – indeed, accomplished and 
prominent authors stand at odds as they attempt to capture its spirit. Allan, et al, note that 
‘Violent extremism is multi-factorial and extremely diverse: it cannot be predicted by one 
variable alone.’253 However, Yahyayev and Sultanakhmedova stipulate ‘the measures to 
eliminate the fundamental causes of extremism and its prevention measures should be 
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prioritized.’254 Logic demands that to counter drivers of extremism in priority of importance 
requires predictability of variables, and specifically the singular one which will initiate action.  
The search for nomenclature and theory to capture the problem set of terrorism appears to 
have come full circle to revisit the previously abandoned concept of mental health disorders 
being linked to terrorism… Allan, et al, note – ‘Psychological research is beginning to examine 
how identity formation can become “maladaptive” and whether certain cognitive “propensities” 
can combine to create a “mindset” that presents a higher risk.’255 Schuurman, et al, are in 
agreeance – ‘They [Lone Wolf terrorists] are people who, more often than not, are forced to plan, 
prepare, and execute acts of terrorist violence on their own due to their disposition, lack of social 
skills, or (borderline) mental health issues.’256 
The search for theory is critical, however, and must not be abandoned. As Stoker and 
Whiteside note ‘theory should teach us to think critically, to analyze…’ with ‘…an informed eye 
to the problem at hand… It provides conceptual tools and grounds us by defining our terms and 
providing us a firm foundation for analysis, while teaching us to distinguish between what is 
important and what is not.’257 This paper demonstrates that the term hybrid has been applied to 
multiple theaters of conflict and modes of warfare. Indeed, if all things are hybrid, then nothing 
is hybrid.258 Stoker and Whiteside also quote Clausewitz who insisted that theory ‘must have 
 
254 Mukhtar Yahyayev and Zalina Sultanakhmedova, ‘Problems of Efficiency in Countering Extremism,’ Central 
Asia and the Caucasus – English Edition 20, no. 3 (2019): 101. 
255 Harriet Allan, Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Jesperson, Sneha Reddy-Tumu, Emily Winterbotham, ‘Drivers of Violent 
Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review,’ October 16th, 2015, Royal United Services Institute. 
256 Bart Schuurman, Lasse Lindekilde, Stefan Malthaner, Francis O'Connor, Paul Gill & Noémie Bouhana, ‘End of 
the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 8 (2019): 773. 
256 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, "Blurred Lines - Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of 
American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (2020): 28. 
257 Ibid., 14. 




been derived from military history, or at least checked against it…’259 While it’s true that 
America has referenced IW history for lessons, this has only occurred selectively. For instance, 
the US garnered the amazing tactical leap of helicopter warfare from Algeria but then learned 
little else regarding the IW nature of the battle. And poignantly, vis-à-vis the subject of this paper 
Clausewitz remarked ‘that theory will have to remain realistic. It cannot allow itself to get lost in 
futile speculation, hairsplitting, and flights of fancy.’260 The concept of Multi-Domain 
Dominance is indicted by Clausewitz in this context, as there can be little argument that IW will 
remain the relevant form of warfare.  
However, America does need to understand the ideology of her enemy, how it prompts 
them into action and the nature of that belief system, beyond operational tenets of holding terrain 
for a caliphate or going dark as a guerrilla fighter. Yaari offers up the concept of Muqawama 
which is literally translated as resistance.261 Indeed it is a component of the actual name for 
Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or Islamic Resistance Movement, which became the 
acronym Hamas).262 According to Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas’s Khaled Mashal it 
is more accurately described as ‘the doctrine of constant combat,’ or ‘persistent warfare,’ with 
the following dynamics: 
1. Peace is not an option: The Arab world must not, because of temporary 
hardship, be dragged into recognizing Israel and accepting its existence through 
peace agreements. When in need of a respite, it is permitted to reach hudna 
(armistice) agreements, valid for a limited period only, with the “Zionist regime.” 
2. It is not necessary to wait for there to be a balance of forces: Unlike president 
Nasser, who aimed to build up enough military might to beat Israel, or president 
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Hafiz al-Asad, who sought what he called “strategic parity,” the disciples of the 
Muqawama Doctrine reject any delay in the fighting unless a hudna is in force. 
On the contrary, even when the balance of forces is clearly in the enemy’s favor, 
they perform the imperative of continual warfare, if only on a small scale. The 
military disadvantage can be narrowed through innovative tactics. For example, 
both Hamas and Hezbollah made a point of kidnapping IDF soldiers from 
armored vehicles. Camouflage is an effective defense against aircraft, and old 
Katyusha rockets or home-made Qassams can provide a response to Israel’s 
superior fire-power. 
3. Do not fight over territory: The goal of the Muqawama is the methodical 
erosion of the enemy’s resolve. There is no need to defend territory against Israeli 
occupation, or to try to conquer land. The essence is to spill blood, and since that 
is the case, it is better to focus on the civilian population as the primary target. 
The motto is blood, not land, and the effort is directed at denying victory to the 
enemy, not at achieving a quick result. 
4. Jihad is not a national struggle: In effect, Iran and its associates in Lebanon and 
Palestine have requisitioned the old formula of the “Popular War of Liberation” 
fashioned by nationalists such as Arafat and the leaders of the Algerian 
revolution, and have injected it with exclusively Islamic content. Fighting is 
undertaken for the sake of Allah, and not out of patriotic sentiment. 
5. The Arab state is not a suitable vehicle: Muqawama is not merely a military 
system, but a comprehensive, alternative regime. The Arab states constitute a 
flawed and inefficient apparatus, unfit to conduct a historic battle. The task must 
be shouldered instead by the Islamic movements that, alongside their military 
activity, engage in societal reform through educational, health and business 
institutions. Hamas and Hezbollah are headed by shura (consultation) councils 
composed of senior clerics. The “Shurocracy” is key to rehabilitating the 
community as well as defeating the enemy, offering an alternative hierarchical 
structure to dictatorships, monarchies and democracies.263 
 
Islamist Jihadis may have other doctrine, but Muqawama best accounts for the long-term 
recurrences through history of Islamist IW. Over the last century Jihadis have sought out 
numerous avenues to war and specifically IW. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem famously recruited 
Bosnian Muslims for the 13th Waffen SS Division, and provided operational guidance to a 
specific IW mission by ‘SS-trained commandos who parachuted into Palestine and Iraq in 1944.  
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Figure 5 The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem salutes the 13th Waffen SS Division.264 
 
The agents' task was to organize an insurgency against the Jewish community in Palestine and to 
attack Iraqi Jews… The infiltrators also had poisons that were likely intended for the Tel Aviv 
water system…’265  
Nasser and the Pan-Arab movement provided guidance to create both the Algerian FLN, 
and the PLO between 1954 and 1964.266 Communists have worked with Jihadis in a variety of 
ways. China sent aid to Palestine as early as 1960.267 Jihadis with the PLO worked and trained 
alongside the IRA and as many as 40 other terrorist groups from the 60s to the 80s.268 In the 80s 
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America provided assistance to Jihadis in the fight against the USSR.269 Nor was there ever a 
break in the fighting; Afghanistan became a factionalized free for all and Kabul lay in ruins 
without electricity from 1993 until the Taliban took over.270 More recently, claims that Russia 
paid Jihadis to kill Americans in Afghanistan have surfaced.271  
History bears out the theme of constant conflict as well as hybrid operations between 
state and non-state actors. The Israeli (and American) response essentially mirrors the concept. 
Mowing the lawn, as it is called, allows for a constant state of small-scale tension using tactics 
like interdicting weapons convoys or targeted killings such as the killing of Imad Mughniyeh, a 
Hezbollah officer, in 2008.272 Intermittent large-scale offensive campaigns occur as needed 
based on enemy activity: 
Israel’s current strategy against hostile non-state actors such as Hamas reflects the 
assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of 
force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but 
rather is a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the 
enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses 
does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes as much as 
possible, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary 
deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along Israel’s borders.273 
 
 
269 Dr. Lorry M. Fenner, Dr. Mark E. Stout and Ms. Jessica L. Goldings, ‘Ten Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s 
Past & Future through Captured Records.’ Conference proceedings at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, 
Washington, D.C., September 13-14, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a569571.pdf. 
270 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars – The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion 
to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 4. 
271 Michael Barbaro, ‘A Russian Plot to Kill U.S. Soldiers,’ Transcript – The Daily Podcast, nytimes.com, The New 
York Times Company, accessed July 20th, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/podcasts/the-daily/russian-
bounties-afghanistan.html?showTranscript=1. 
272 Chuck Freilich and James F. Jeffrey, ‘Beyond 'Mowing the Grass': U.S. and Israeli Strategy in the Middle East,’ 
Policy Analysis, washingtoninstitute.org, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, last updated April 24, 
2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/beyond-mowing-the-grass-us-and-israeli-strategy-
in-the-middle-east. 
273 Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, ‘Mowing the Grass in Gaza,’ The Jerusalem Post, Jpost Inc., last updated July 




Israel first coined the phrase, but America’s tacticization of strategy reduces grand strategy-level 
responses to a kinetic ‘whack-a-mole’ reactionary execution. It can only be considered a stop-
gap according to Boot:  
‘One thing is clear: The primary U.S. focus since 2001, of killing and capturing 
terrorists, can only limit the problem; it cannot solve it. The U.S. military is 
engaged in what many officers call “mowing the lawn”: it has to be done, but the 
“grass,” i.e., the terrorists, will always grow back as long as they operate in terrain 
that is not controlled day and night by the U.S. or its allies.’274 
 
Having identified the Muqawama strategic mindset, the true intention of Islamist Jihadis 
becomes more attainable. Jihadis and Mujahideen have taken a classic jihad concept and made it 
their own, effectively hijacking the term and rendering it actionable at both state and sub-state 
levels (individuals such as hostages). That there is little support among mainstream Muslims is 
no surprise, being that Muslims and Muslim countries bear the brunt of terror attacks.275 The 
effective rebirth of jihad as an obligation to make war against unbelievers is likely a fait 
accompli owing to the mainstreaming through media and internet.276 
Notably there is no question for the Mujahideen or Jihadis if they are competing above or 
below a level of warfare. As students of Mao and their own literature they know there is only 
war, guerilla, large-scale, conventional or otherwise – Mao stated clearly ‘guerrilla operations 
must not be considered as an independent form of war. They are but one step in the total war…’ 
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and ‘the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole.’277 This is in keeping 
with the contemporary trend of today’s Mujahideen rebranding Jihad in their image; they have a 
well-worn trail behind them as well, with Islamic history from 7th to 13th century effectively 
consisting of IW throughout and constantly. Sir John Bagot Glubb, wrote of his Arab 
counterparts in battle: [they] ‘swept irresistibly forward without organization, without pay, 
without plans, and without orders. They constitute a perpetual warning to technically advanced 
nations who rely for their defence (sic) on scientific progress rather than the human spirit.’ 278 
This is seen plainly in the tactics of ISIS. General Joseph Votel commanding US Central 
Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) in May of 2016 told reporters that ISIS ‘may be reverting in 
some regards back to their terrorist roots.’ This was before Mosul had even been lost, and ISIS 
was still conducting conventional attacks, armed convoys and artillery barrages. They began to 
transition to small unit attacks, ambushes and hasty raids without attempting to gain and hold 
control of terrain.279  
IV. CONCLUSION 
IW is only another way of war, and tactics cannot dictate the outcome of military 
campaigns in place of a long-term strategy. Combatants will select the best option for victory. If 
the enemy is tactically stronger, a populace-centric approach to win public opinion may be more 
viable. Warfare of any form can be cast aside when political demands render its continuance 
untenable. States have expected responses as well; kinetic (enemy-centric) responses grown from 
the global reaction to Munich have perpetuated as a means to demonstrate an active threat 
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response. In doing so, Western countries attempt to maintain their Westphalian monopoly on the 
use of force. America was hardly alone in this issue, as several governments of the world chose 
kinetic-based direct action solutions. A COIN-based policy will have greater importance to the 
practice of IW and the success of military campaigns over the long-term time span of any nation. 
Populace-centric efforts are lagging and Boot notes that America must go beyond ‘mowing the 
lawn…’ Until that is achieved, it is right to say America simply doesn’t know much at all about 
IW.280 Actively combating the ideology in play by our enemy demands conducting nation-
building activities such as ‘military, diplomatic, intelligence, and other development… 
[otherwise] Islamist terrorism isn’t going to disappear any time soon.’281 Doctrine and ideology 
are the drivers for action that compel nations to war; failing to address them by obscuring them 
with labels such as extremism only clouds the issue. 
As noted in the NDAA for 2018, IW encompasses ‘activities in support of predetermined 
United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, 
irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state 
actors short of traditional armed conflict.’282 Much as there was no need to expand beyond 
terrorism with the term extremism, there is no need to expand beyond IW with undefined terms 
such as hybrid, gray zone, or unrestricted, because in the end no one agrees on any of them. IW 
as used in military terminology provides a working theory from which much can be determined. 
Defensive postures and offensive postures are both present, demonstrating a balanced approach – 
defense is captured with FID, stability operations, COIN, and CT operations to preserve a 
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regime. Offensively UW works to overthrow a regime. From the perspective of the populace, 
revolt is seen in two perspectives – insurgency is revolt with popular support while terrorism 
offers revolt seeking popular support. Post-conflict, stability operations provide the non-violent 
nation-building options that provide the means to capture the all-important public opinion. What 
then of pre-conflict influence and opinion building?  
Figure 6 Joint force operational phases by military activity283
 
 
This paper posits that the military definition of IW must come into line with the statutory 
definition. Shaping operations, though doctrinal, are loosely defined as activities occurring 
continuously to support requirements or a specific joint operation plan during its execution. 
These should be tied to IW and defined as non-violent military operations to set the conditions 
 




for the dominance of American interests and added to both the IW definition in JP 1 and JP 1-02, 
the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. This addition would prompt the inclusion 
of IW into Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) by the Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs) 
and provide a cognitive opening for military theory expansion of IW. Doctrine is the means to 
carry forward concepts and operational tenets beyond party and political differences. Policy 
makers can then provide operational relevance unblemished by party ties and unimpeded by the 
























Is IW a greater threat than traditional warfare within GPC? America’s NDS is used by the 
DOD to define the current strategic environment. It describes a complex global environment 
described as GPC, containing both IW and traditional warfare, and comprised of five major 
threats (chapter two addressed one of these – VEOs). Chapter three will examine two near-peer 
competitors, (China and Russia), as well as two rogue states (North Korea and Iran). China, 
Russia, and Iran are state actors with legitimate instruments of national power and the ability to 
spread broad influence on the world stage. They have partner nations as well as proxies that will 
act on their behalf and in their interests in return for patronage. North Korea is listed as a rogue 
state but suffers from its pariah status, such that it is typically seen to seek China’s patronage.    
As described previously, IW is a means to compete that is short of traditional warfare. 
This chapter will investigate various facets of IW as displayed by the four state actors in the 
NDS, though it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to take on a full discussion of four states 
(plus VEOs) and their policies – it is not all-inclusive. Section I addresses China and their use of 




IW executed through their proxy forces, Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia is examined in 
section III, with a discussion of the efforts to reverse engineer doctrine and the resulting poor 
verbiage coming out of the Crimea campaign. Proxy elements and Private Military Companies 
(PMCs) are also examined. Section IV examines North Korea’s proxy status to China. Their use 
of cyber, criminal, and weapons dealing suggests they are following a familiar pattern to work 
within a support network (China, Iran and Syria). In conclusion, this chapter notes that America 
should take an aggressive stance to recoup losses to China, deploy Counterintelligence as an 
offensive measure, and reset the playing field for all parties to acknowledge.  
I. CHINA 
A critical point in all IW is the need of accurate and actionable intelligence. Whether the 
action to be taken is kinetic, non-kinetic, or merely defines the operational environment, this 
requirement is paramount. As noted by Warner, the primary means of COIN can be described as 
‘mostly measured uses of force and lots of human intelligence.’284 Such intelligence can come 
with its own price tag – the French in Algeria demonstrated that torture for intelligence could 
work tactically (winning them Algiers), but also cost strategic footing on the world stage in terms 
of losing common ground with other nations. This lesson was amongst the many ignored and 
repeated by the United States in the GWOT, as scandal erupted around the waterboarding of 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed and later the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.285 
China’s intelligence collection model currently blends broad sweeps conducted via 
hacking, IP theft and remote social media operations, as well as expansive use of Chinese 
citizens with traditional recruiting operations. The intelligence community (IC) believes that the 
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Chinese represent the gravest threat against US security, having surpassed the USSR as early as 
1980 in terms of conducting espionage.286 Their human intelligence (HUMINT) has undergone a 
quantum improvement in scope and effect over the last two decades and serves as an example of 
the critical ties between intelligence and IW. Beyond a hybrid of military options, they have used 
legalities to ascribe all corporate and private gains to the Communist Party, thus extending their 
reach as a nation as far as possible.287  
a. REMOTE IW: HACKING & BLENDED APPROACHES 
The hacking of the US Government’s (USG) Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
database has helped set the conditions for future IW operations by specifically compromising 
personnel files of intelligence officers. The family contacts and financial information contained 
therein would provide a means of external hostile control, allowing exploitation of said 
intelligence officers through coercion or blackmail, as noted by members of the USG such as 
Senator Ben Sasse.288 It is unknown how China may exploit this data in the future, but within 
reason to see the recent acceleration of Chinese espionage as linked to the event. Concerns that 
China could be mapping out a USG-wide knowledge set of vulnerabilities based on access and 
placement of people revealed in the OPM breach were immediate.289   
Joel Brenner, a former National Security Agency (NSA) senior counsel, believes 
clearance forms from DOD-related intelligence agencies, including NSA and the Defense 
 
286 Peter L. Mattis, ‘A Professional Assessment of Chinese Espionage,’ International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence 28, no. 2 (2015): 398. 
287 Richard McGregor, ‘How the State Runs Business in China,’ foxbusiness.com, last updated July 25th, 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-party-state-private-
enterprise-huawei. 
288 Senator Ben Sasse, ‘The OPM Hack May Have Given China a Spy Recruiting Database,’ wired.com, accessed 
November 16, 2019, https://www.wired.com/2015/07/senator-sasse-washington-still-isnt-taking-opm-breach-
seriously/. 
289Kevin Liptak, Theodore Schleifer and Jim Sciutto, ‘China might be building vast database of federal worker info, 





Intelligence Agency (DIA), could be accessed through OPM. It is likely that the only intelligence 
agency free and clear of the issue is the CIA, who refused to allow OPM oversight of their 
records. “CIA refuses to put its people’s information in with OPM, and of course they’re right,” 
Brenner said. One lesson to draw from the breach, he said, is that “any serious clandestine 
agency has to be in charge of its own personnel information. Full stop.”290 The impact of this 
hack is hard to overstate: “This is crown jewels material … a gold mine for a foreign intelligence 
service. This is not the end of American human intelligence, but it’s a significant blow,” Brenner 
stated.291 The Director of National Intelligence (at the time) James Clapper acknowledged “you 
have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.”292 
Potentially as many as 32 million people’s records were compromised in the hack.293 The 
arrest of a Chinese national by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2017 places the 
blame squarely at the feet of the CCP.294 It has not been acknowledged to what extent the 
Scattered Castles database of intelligence personnel was compromised. While USG officials 
deny that Scattered Castles was breached, they have neither confirmed nor denied if the OPM 
database was linked to Scattered Castles; some reporting indicates that they were sharing 
information in 2014.295  
 




292 Mike Levine, ‘China Is “Leading Suspect” in Massive Hack of US Government Networks,’ abcnews.go.com, 
accessed November 16, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/US/china-leading-suspect-massive-hack-us-government-
networks/story?id=32036222.  
293 U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Intelligence Services and Espionage Threats to 
the United States, 114th US Congress, 2nd session, November 2016, chapter 2, section 3, report to House and Senate. 
294 Evan Perez, ‘FBI Arrests Chinese National in OPM Data Breach,’ Politics, cnn.com, Turner Broadcasting 
System, accessed November 16th, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-
opm-data-breach/index.html. 
295 U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Intelligence Services and Espionage Threats to 




Blended techniques are proving both expansive and successful; like all means of IW, they 
do not elevate an issue to the level of an armed response. During 2019 the expanded use of these 
blended techniques resulted in the FBI conducting approximately 1,000 investigations into 
Chinese espionage or theft of intellectual property.296 Law enforcement officials have 
determined that the OPM hack appears to have been carried out by the same Chinese hackers 
who attacked Anthem Insurance in 2015, in which information on tens of millions of customers 
was stolen.297 This is a critical point, revealing that the same efforts and organizations working 
to steal national level intelligence is working to steal commercial information as economic 
espionage. John Demers, the head of the National Security Division at the Justice Department 
notes that China uses economic espionage as Research and Development; Chinese law mandates 
that all corporations cooperate with the government on national security.298 Demers further 
stated that China uses the same tactics and even some of the same intelligence officers in its 
espionage efforts against America’s private sector. ‘What it shows is how seriously the Chinese 
government takes their intellectual-property-theft efforts, because they’re really using the crown 
jewels of their intelligence community and their most sophisticated and well-honed 
tradecraft.’299 Rod Rosenstein, who was Deputy US Attorney General at the time: ‘More than 90 
percent of the department’s cases alleging economic espionage over the past seven years involve 
China… More than two-thirds of the department’s cases involving thefts of trade secrets are 
connected to China.’300 
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China has also adapted a remote ‘screening’ approach using social media. William R. 
Evanina is the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, an organization 
he has led since June 2, 2014. He serves as the head of Counterintelligence (CI) for the USG and 
as the principal CI and security advisor to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).301 
Evanina lays out the simplicity of the remote screening model: “What you have is an intelligence 
officer sitting in Beijing…and he can send out 30,000 emails a day. And if he gets 300 replies, 
that’s a high-yield, low-risk intelligence operation.” 302 Elaborating on the nature of this 
vulnerability, Evanina noted that China will wait years to target people (such as those in the 
OPM hack): “Your Spidey sense goes down.” But “your memory is not erased”— which is to 
say that remembered information is still of value to the Chinese.303 
Chinese travelers provide another remote approach that safeguards their intelligence 
officers. Business representatives, academics, scientists, students, and tourists supplement their 
intelligence collection.304 The use of students is so pervasive that Chinese defector Chen Yonglin 
claims of US campuses “the Chinese student organization in every school is under control,” and 
“operation funds mostly come from the education department of the consulate, and meetings are 
held on consulate grounds.”305 
Much of what is occurring could only be possible through the Chinese propaganda 
campaign that has lasted decades. The American media, sympathetic to the left by their own 
admission, now report China is no longer Communist: ‘Beijing needs to regularly encourage 
nationalism, having long abandoned communism as an ideology in the face of economic growth 
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and a widening wealth gap.’306 Likewise, apologists in the media fail to grasp the aggression 
inherent in China’s actions:  
More likely, it's because China doesn't really see itself as a rival to the United 
States. Most of China's foreign policy establishment was educated in the United 
States and many of them have internalized American viewpoints as their own. 
They are ambitious to increase China's power and influence in the world, 
certainly, but for many of them the whole idea that China could take on the 
United States is ludicrous.307 
 
In the face of such falsehoods (the CIA World Factbook reports China’s form of 
government as ‘communist party-led state’) the American populace are understandably gullible 
in dealing with the Chinese.308 Such long-term IW campaigns understandably benefit from 
governments that have life-long party rulers common to authoritarian states, while America’s 
peaceful transition of power every four years puts her at a disadvantage due to short-sighted 
party politics. Indeed, such political gamesmanship has resulted in America and her allies sealing 
(as opposed to prosecuting) indictments against Chinese hackers ‘detailing and condemning 
various network intrusions and data breaches that date back to 2006.’309 
b. IW VIA LAWFARE AND BUSINESS PROXY 
The Anthem hack reveals how Chinese IW can overlap into the business world, but 
hacking is only one aspect. Other illustrative examples of IW in China are found through their 
use of lawfare. Lawfare is used by China to ‘manipulate international and domestic law to assert 
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Chinese interests,’ and do so below the level of armed conflict as a critical component of IW.310 
It is not specific to China, however in 2003 they developed the concept of the ‘Three Warfares’ 
which include Lawfare, Psychological Warfare, and Media Warfare. The intent of this concept 
was to enable China to gain favor in key areas of competition. The Small Wars Journal notes its 
use to manipulate international and domestic law to assert Chinese interests.311 Lawfare justifies 
China’s actions as legal to create doubt regarding proper retaliation against China, and is used 
specifically as IW to impede American planners who cannot justify armed conflict as a 
response.312 
An example is the release of new legislation in June by China affecting Hong Kong: 
The national security law’s criminal provisions resemble those governing the 
Chinese mainland, and they allow life imprisonment for “principal offenders” in 
the aforementioned categories of activity—which are defined broadly. The law 
also establishes a mainland-run agency in Hong Kong—the Office for 
Safeguarding National Security—which has the authority to take control of 
security investigations from local law enforcement. Central Chinese authorities 
will wield significant influence over the law’s interpretation and application. 
Mainland China will retain jurisdiction over “complex” cases brought under the 
law, including those that involve foreign collusion. And Hong Kong’s courts have 
no authority to interpret the national security law. The power of interpretation 
instead lies with the NPC, as preliminary reports on the law’s provisions 
suggested would be the case.313 
 
Hong Kong citizens feel their rights are being trampled under the new Chinese law and 
fear it is a move away from the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ doctrine. The UK views the 
Chinese law as a violation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration (which stipulated the ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ doctrine) and is offering passports to residents of Hong Kong. China in 
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turn threatens retaliation for the perceived slight and the increase in threatening rhetoric is 
spilling into other domains such as the business world. The row over Hong Kong increases the 
potential for the UK to cancel dealings with Huawei, with the UK Prime Minister referring to 
them as a ‘Hostile State Vendor.’314 
Huawei is a Chinese telecom company seeking to capitalize on the emergent global 
upgrade from the 4G cellular network to a new 5G offering. 5G touts ultra-low latency and much 
higher capacity (less signal delay for faster and bigger downloads) than the current 4G cellular 
network, but is currently described as a ‘disappointing, incremental upgrade on 4G.’315 The 
company’s Chief Financial Officer, Meng Wanzhou (also vice-chair of the Board and daughter 
of the company’s founder) was arrested at the Vancouver airport while in transit to China in 
2018. She is being held by Canada for extradition to the US, essentially dragging Canada into 
what has become another 4+1 international scenario (China, US, UK, Canada + Hong Kong). 
She has been indicted by the US for planning to ‘obtain prohibited U.S. goods and technology 
for Huawei’s Iran-based business via Skycom, and move money out of Iran by deceiving a major 
bank. The indictment alleges that Skycom was an “unofficial subsidiary” of Huawei, not a local 
partner.’316 More recently, America’s Federal Communications Commission has determined that 
both Huawei and ZTE are ‘national security threats.’317 Huawei is known to have distanced 
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themselves from Skycom as early as 2013 due to American sanctions by changing managers, 
shutting down a Tehran office and forming another business to take over Skycom contracts.318 
The law in China regarding Huawei (and every company) is clear. ‘Any organization and 
citizen’ shall ‘support and cooperate in national intelligence work.’ 319 As such, it is not only 
likely but inevitable that Huawei’s bid to capture the newest IT market would play out as a threat 
model. One need only reference Tiktok, whose recently released beta version for Apple’s iOS 14 
was accessing users’ clipboards, to imagine the exploitation possible with Huawei operating in 
the 5G marketspace.320 In 2013 the cost of China’s criminal actions vis-à-vis stolen American 
trade secrets was estimated to be $300B.321 A completely predictable outcome of China’s 
expansion in intelligence collection is the commoditization and marketing of both their 
commercial and defense secrets to the highest bidder (certainly if they managed the 5G market 
space). This would fit nicely with Communist China’s current position straddling the line 
between historic revolution-backer and 21st century free-market maverick. Providing secrets to 
nefarious actors to target America or allies can accomplish many ends for China, such as 
developing revenue and capacity building of proxy nations. More concerning should be the 
potential for VEO patronage that disrupts and distracts American efforts with little or no 
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footprint and will inevitably cost American lives. This is the true cost of America’s poor 
Operational Security (OPSEC).  
II. IRAN 
The Islamic Republic of Iran went through its revolution in 1979, ousting the Shah of 
Iran and emplacing the Ayatollah Khomeini. One of the key factors of Iran’s successes over the 
last 40 years has been their propensity for IW. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, this is primarily 
the responsibility of the Islamic Republic Guards Corps (IRGC) and specifically the Quds Force 
of the IRGC. Court documents, specifically Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, revealed 
that the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (working through the IRGC) spent between 
$50-100M in 1997 sponsoring various proxy non-state terror actors.322  
The IRGC exports training, arms, and occasionally troops to non-state actor proxy forces 
such as Hamas and Hezbollah.323 In the case of Lebanese Hezbollah (not to be confused with 
other elements operating under the name Hezbollah or party of god), they are virtually an arm of 
the Iranian military, deployed into Iraq and Syria to carry out Iranian mandates and solidified in 
yet another 4+1 doctrine (identifying Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah as the 
‘+1’ non-state actor in the relationship).324 These two forces demonstrate Iran’s true mastery of 
IW with Hezbollah specifically acting as a ‘global, multifaceted organization, engaged in a wide 
range of endeavors, including overt social and political activities in Lebanon, military activities 
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in Lebanon, Syria, and throughout the Middle East, and covert militant, criminal, and terrorist 
activities elsewhere around the world.’325 
a. HEZBOLLAH 
Lebanese Hezbollah owe their very existence to Iran. In June of 1982, Israel invaded 
southern Lebanon to fight the PLO, followed rapidly by an international peace-keeping force 
(including the United States) which entered the country in the fall of 1982.326 Syrian forces as 
well had occupied Lebanon for decades, and in this chaos, a group of militants and religious 
leaders broke away from the Shia group Amal in 1982. Iran sent 1500 troops from the IRGC to 
the Bekka Valley in Lebanon, where “Hezbollah recruits were first indoctrinated to Khomeini’s 
vision of political Shiism and trained to resist what he perceived as the hegemonic order that the 
United States, with Israeli assistance, was attempting to establish in the region.”327 In such an 
environment, targets of opportunity would not be hard to find. 
The targets selected were both spectacular and high payoff: in 1983 the American 
Embassy and the United States Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut were both struck by suicide 
truck bombs that killed 63 people in the embassy and 241 in the barracks. French barracks were 
bombed simultaneously with the United States barracks killing 58 French paratroopers.328 There 
remains considerable controversy regarding the role of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran, who deny 
any part in the attacks, though it is unclear why, since Lebanese Hezbollah reference it in their 
own infamous Open Letter: ‘The first punishment against these forces was carried out on 18 
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April and the second on 29 October 1983.’329 There is admittedly some confusion on the second 
date (the USMC Beirut barracks were bombed on 23 October 1983), but the first date is the 
accurate date the US Embassy in Beirut was bombed. Hala Jaber, in her 1997 book about 
Hezbollah, claims:  
Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi—a founder of Hezbollah—
helped organize the Beirut bombings in consultation with Syrian intelligence. She 
asserts the Marine barracks bomb was prepared in eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley, then under Syrian control. Hezbollah and the Syrian and Iranian 
governments have denied any role in the bombings, though in 2004 Iran 
reportedly erected a monument in Tehran to the attacks and its “martyrs.”330 
 
The bombings were primarily attributed to Imad Mughniyeh, a Lebanese Hezbollah operative 
who rose to be their International Operations Commander and was further blamed for the 
kidnapping, torture, and murder of CIA Chief of Station William Buckley. Mughniyeh operated 
in Argentina as well, and in 1992 bombed their Israeli Embassy, killing 29 people. In 1994 he 
bombed the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), also in Buenos Aires, and killed 85 
people. Mughniyeh was assassinated in 2008 by a joint Mossad-CIA operation.331 
Like many terrorist organizations, Lebanese Hezbollah chose to branch into politics, and 
in 1989 began legitimate efforts to do so. Having gained the blessing of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s Ayatollah Khameini, the Lebanese Hezbollah has been involved in every Lebanese 
election since then.332 Lebanese Hezbollah took up the “Lebanonization” of their party narrative 
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to ensure that they did not alienate their own populace, as many were understandably weary of 
violence.333 Maintaining this support is done by the tried and true methods of public services; 
keeping the poor and oppressed in mind they provide social welfare to the Shia population of 
Lebanon. All the while Lebanese Hezbollah has fought a war of attrition against Israel and 
balanced their responsibilities to such a degree that they rose to be the most powerful party in 
Lebanon, pushed Israel out in 2000, and achieved a tactical ‘draw’ in 2006.334 Their patrons 
meanwhile continue to increase support, and in 2012 Iran was estimated to provide $700M in aid 
to Lebanese Hezbollah. 335   
Iran uses Lebanese Hezbollah to continue exporting its model of Shiism, as well as 
silence dissent. In 2014, Iran worked with the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Badr Corps (historically 
aligned with Iran), and Kata’ib Hezbollah to create ‘Hezbollah in Syria.’ These elements follow 
the example of Lebanese Hezbollah, and as Shias are ideologically mandated to follow the Wali-
al-Faqih (Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khameini, serving as senior Shia jurist and theologian) as 
noted by the Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in 1987.336 More recently in Iraq, the 
Popular Mobilization Units are largely Shia and pro-Iranian, which is certainly cause for concern 
as they are 120,000-strong.337 The Lebanese Hezbollah model of Iranian proxy warfare has also 
been used abroad as a long arm of Shia retribution: Between 1979 and 1994, the CIA reported 
that Iran “murdered Iranian defectors and dissidents in West Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and Turkey.” Overall, more than 60 individuals were targeted in assassination 
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attempts. In many cases, Hezbollah members functioned as the logistics experts or gunmen in 
these plots.338 
From a proxy force prosecuting targets for Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah has fully graduated 
to a deployable expeditionary model that further indoctrinates along party lines. Branching even 
further Lebanese Hezbollah operations include “drugs and arms trafficking, human smuggling, 
trade in contraband, money-laundering and financial fraud that have been observed not only in 
the Middle East but also in Asia, Africa, North America, and South America.”339 Lebanese 
Hezbollah activities in Latin America netted as much as $50M between 1995 and 2002.340 Such 
findings suggest a fully operational and self-organizing entity that is on its own mission against 
its own targets, while still beholding to the Islamic Republic of Iran and accomplishing their 
mission sets. 
b. HAMAS 
Iran saw an opportunity to turn Palestinian sentiment towards Iran in the rise of the 
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas).341 The 
Palestinians sided with Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 to 1988, and Iran sought to change 
this situation.342 Hamas was created from the membership base of the Palestinian Muslim 
Brotherhood. By the time of the 1987 intifada, the PLO’s Arafat was living in exile in Tunisia 
and had great difficulty controlling events in the Gaza Strip. Hamas began challenging Arafat for 
leadership and by February 1988, began leaflet drops to challenge the PLO’s authority 
(specifically the Fatah faction).343 The early performance of Hamas was largely lackluster; over a 
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thousand of their people (including top leaders) were arrested and hundreds forced into exile in 
Lebanon by Israel.344 Hezbollah shepherded these leaders to Tehran seeking aid in 1990; it was 
at this point that Iran began the arming, funding, and training of Hamas. 345 By 1992, Arafat 
(leading the opposing Fatah faction of the PLO) was on record as complaining about Iran 
sponsoring Hamas to the tune of $30 million a year.346 This was also a propaganda victory for 
Iran, whose stated constitutional goal is to prosper all Muslims everywhere, not just Shias.347  
Notably, it was Hezbollah that trained Hamas, and the success of Hamas’s first suicide 
bombings in 1994 is tied to Hezbollah (as opposed to the IRGC-Quds Force, unless considered 
indirectly as a second or third order effect).348 The suicide bombings in 1994 (along with other 
efforts by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas) were aimed at embarrassing Arafat who was attending 
the Oslo Accords as the nominal representative of the Palestinians.349 Hamas intended to wrest 
that title from him and the decade of the 1990s saw strange bedfellows as Fatah and Israel 
worked together to fight Hamas and bring stability to the region.350 
Hamas as a Sunni organization is not tied to a singular religious leader (read: Iran).351 
This is important as Islam serves as both a religion and political orientation, and as such they use 
Sunniism to justify any number of positions that go beyond the scope of Shiism. Key among 
these is seeking support from other states than Iran, such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.352  
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Lebanese Hezbollah’s experience in their 2006 war with Israel served to educate the 
Hamas organization, who used their Lebanese counterpart’s stalemate with the Israeli Defense 
Forces to inform their own efforts. In 2007 Hamas and Fatah fought for the control of the Gaza 
Strip in a civil war. 353 The Hamas political arm had built a broad public support base owing in 
large part to the social services provided such as schools and hospitals.354 Hamas won the Gaza 
Strip and left Fatah in charge of the Palestinian Authority, which was then essentially the West 
Bank territory.355 
Hamas angered their patrons by siding with the popular uprisings that occurred in the 
Arab Spring, and specifically by turning against Syria in 2012. Syria had been more than a 
stalwart supporter… Hamas had actually housed their external headquarters in Damascus since 
1999.356 This effectively placed them against Tehran and the 4+1 coalition (Russia, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah).357 They have since reportedly reached out via Iran to seek 
talks with Syria (as it appears Syrian leader Assad will stay in power) and offered to provide Iran 
with locations of Israeli missiles. This offer reportedly involves Iranian aid to Hamas increasing 
from $6M monthly to $30M monthly, and may represent a new collective defense agreement 




353 Daniel Byman, ‘Is Hamas Winning?,’ The Washington Quarterly, (2013): 64. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Rafael D. Frankel, ‘Keeping Hamas and Hezbollah out of a War with Iran,’ The Washington Quarterly, (2012): 
59. 
357 Daniel Byman, ‘Is Hamas Winning?,’ The Washington Quarterly, (2013): 65. 
358 Michael Bachner and TOI staff, ‘Iran said increasing Hamas funding to $30m per month, wants intel on Israel,’ 






A key aspect of all IW operations is the need for accurate intelligence; as demonstrated 
by the Chinese efforts, these can take on their own operational lifespan, particularly when 
executed at scale. In the case of Russian advances into the Crimean Peninsula, intelligence was 
literally so accurate that the resulting Information Warfare operations allowed for a takeover 
almost devoid of conflict.359 While this was a masterful achievement, the issues with using this 
campaign to denote new or ground-breaking terminology are two-fold: first is the effort to 
reverse engineer a term based on activities in a single campaign; second is the inherent failings 
of the terms hybrid and Gerasimov doctrine, and the resulting confusion.360  
a. REVERSE ENGINEERING 
In discussing the apparent effort to reverse engineer a strategic design from Crimea, two 
prime examples are available. In Little Green Men, the authors lay out the following principles of 
Russian doctrine in the Crimea:  
1. Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation 
2. Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance information, 
and intelligence 
3. Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, 
especially toward the Russian-speaking populace 
4. Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations 
5. Use of unidentified local and Russian agents 
6. Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation 
7. Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous 
actions of local troops/militias 
8. Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units 
e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, regular troops 
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9. Asymmetric, nonlinear actions361 
 
Clearly these facets reach far beyond UW or military operations to include all legitimate 
aspects of national instruments of power and even further to illegitimate ones such as criminal 
and civilians not associated with the government. That alone predicates a need for monumental 
intelligence to coordinate such diverse aspects of an operation. Renz and Smith note that 
Russia’s intelligence collection allowed for a victory on the Crimean Peninsula which is unlikely 
to be repeated elsewhere – the physical capture and control of internet and telecom infrastructure 
which stood geographically as a single point of failure. This allowed for dominance of the 
information domain which set the stage for further operations.362  
b. TYPOLOGY FAILURE 
Renz and Smith note that the ‘hybrid warfare’ concept is not suitable as an analytical tool 
for assessing Russian military capabilities or foreign policy intentions and should therefore not 
be used as the basis for strategic decision-making and defence (sic) planning.’ They further state 
that ‘the ‘hybrid warfare’ umbrella is likely to obscure more than it can explain in terms of 
analysis and risks arriving at skewed conclusions that could even be playing into Russia’s 
hands.’363 The term hybrid was noted by Wigell to encompass ‘the renewed Russian threat to 
European security, Chinese tactics to win battles without open conflict in the South China Sea, 
and the challenge to western civilization posed by non-state actors such as the Islamic State in 
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Iraq and Syria (ISIS).’364 One may surmise the unlikelihood that all these functions fit so neatly 
under a single label. Stoker and Whiteside note: ‘by confusing competition among adversaries 
with things called hybrid or gray-zone war, we risk conflating everything with war—a dangerous 
proposition.’365  
Another unfortunate finding is the use of the term Gerasimov Doctrine in reference to 
modern Russian IW efforts. Fridman notes that the originator of the term, Mark Galeotti, has 
publicly apologized for coining the phrase; it turns out Gerasimov’s famous quotations were 
someone else’s work. Adamsky further notes that the use of such terminology has led to 
mischaracterization of Russian operations.366  
Such doctrinally problematic issues are further illustrated in Little Green Men. Though 
published by USASOC’s Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies 
Group, it allows for stipulations that vary from published DOD doctrine. Specifically, the authors 
have noted: 
The title’s reference to unconventional warfare is intended to include the 
full spectrum of Russian activities in the subject time frame (2013–2014), 
including diplomatic coercion, intimidation, bribery, manipulation of media, 
terror, subterfuge, sabotage, and a host of other kinetic and nonkinetic activities. 
There are many terms and concepts that contribute to the study of modern 
conflict, including irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, new-generation warfare, and 
others. Each term has competing definitions and nuances, and each adds value to 
the ongoing discussion and analysis. Russian activities in Ukraine featured 
elements of many of these ideas. But for the purpose of clarity and uniformity 
within this study, the authors use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the 
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wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, 
cultural, and religious activities observed and analyzed.367 
 
As previously pointed out in this paper, such a definition goes beyond the scope of UW, 
which is doctrinally defined as resistance-based warfare utilizing a guerrilla force to overthrow a 
sovereign government. IW as an umbrella term is the closest doctrinal term to the context above; 
it captures all manner of competition executed below the threshold of traditional warfare. It is 
also a statutory term per §1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act.368 
The Russian mindset of future warfare is summarized by Berzins as: 
…the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main 
battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated 
by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in 
troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s 
armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the 
necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making 
the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment 
of their own government and country. It is interesting to note the notion of 
permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical 
structure, the clear enemy is Western civilization, its values, culture, political 
system, and ideology.369 
 
 
What becomes clear through Berzins’ work with the National Defense Academy of 
Latvia and that of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory is that similar 
constructs and assumptions are being assigned to Russian motivations across academia (in very 
different settings). This validates the concerns of Renz and Smith that analyses can easily be 
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obscured, conclusions skewed and Russian strategy is in danger of being solely discerned based 
upon their Crimean efforts. Russian operations in the Crimea took full advantage of lines of 
operation within a closed environment that met their requirements. Russia used intelligence to 
identify the most favorable conditions for IW, instigated revolt among the sympathetic populace 
and let the pro-Russian militias be seen doing the fighting. Since they didn’t engage in open 
conflict, they maintained arguable deniability of conducting open warfare against neighbor 
states, ostensibly to stay within the Westphalian model.370 It cannot be coincidental that both 
Georgia and then the Ukraine were cited as moving to join NATO, and then were both invaded 
by Russia.371 Perhaps a better gauge for Russian activity would be for policymakers to examine 
where Russia has conceived of herself to be slighted. 
c. PROXIES AND PMCs 
Russia further embraces IW by enabling their proxy states’ activities in conduct best 
termed as war crimes. In the case of Syria, there have been 34 uses of chemical weapons 
confirmed by the UN’s Human Rights Council since the war began in 2011, and more than 80 
have been reported in total.372 Even after Russia took part in brokering an agreement for the 
Syrians to turn over their weapons, positive proof came back that the chemical strikes matched 
weapons in Syrian stockpiles (that were supposedly destroyed). Russia then used its seat on the 
UN Security Council to vote against renewing the mandate of the investigative commission, 
which disbanded, leaving no investigative authority to research chemical attacks in Syria. 
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Meanwhile, Russian industry looks to extraction projects including Velada and Mercury, both 
owned by long-time Putin confidant Yevgeny Prigozhin, alleged to own the Wagner Group.373   
Figure 7 East Ghouta, Syria374 
 
 
Russian IW efforts must include discussion of Private Military Contractors (PMC) such 
as the Wagner Group. The use of paramilitary, mercenary, or private forces, depending on one’s 
definition, has a strong Russian history tied to the people known as Cossacks. Originally neither 
racial, national, ethnic or religious, this militaristic subculture has existed since at least the 15th 
and perhaps even the 13th century. Modern Cossacks have experienced a rebirth since the demise 
of the USSR, and Putin has recognized them as a military force with a distinct ethno-cultural 
identity that includes Cossack schools with standard subjects but also Cossack traditions and 
history.375 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace makes this element of IW very 
clear. PMC use by Russia should be expected to expand, as they are cost-effective, resource-
efficient, and deniable: ‘It is also unlikely that exposing Moscow’s shadowy practices will 
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prompt reevaluation or embarrassment on the part of Russian policymakers. Indeed, the use of 
surrogates is a long-established practice in Russian and Soviet foreign policies.’376 
Russian PMCs are utilized in both offensive and defensive means operationally.377 
Wagner is thought to have been involved in the assault on a US position in Syria in 2018 
(American intelligence reports they were definitely Russian). The PMC’s true independence of 
action and freedom of maneuver is illustrated by the report that Russian military claimed they 
were not in command of this element (American forces tried to deconflict the situation in order 
to avoid engaging this force). After the paramilitary unit attacked with artillery and tank fire and 
Russia denied knowledge, the apparently rogue element was brutally repulsed and US forces 
killed between 2-300 of the attackers with CAS provided by F-22 aircraft and their own direct 
fires (no Americans were killed).378 
These tactical taskings can have strategic impact, such as securing state-level 
infrastructure assets: Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak revealed in March 2017 that 
Moscow and their Syrian counterpart executed a five year contract for a newly registered 
Russian firm called Evro Polis to “liberate oil and gas fields, plants and other infrastructure 
captured by enemies of the regime, and then guard them.” In return they received a quarter of the 
fields’ output and compensation for their military expenditures.379 
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Figure 8 PMCs deployed by Russia380
 
 
More recently, Russian PMCs are thought to have participated in the June seizure of 
Libyan oil fields by paramilitary forces. Libya’s National Oil Corporation Chairman Mustafa 
Sanalla commented: 
Libya’s oil is for the Libyan people, and I completely reject attempts by foreign 
countries to prevent the resumption of oil production. It is noteworthy that many 
countries are themselves benefitting from the absence of Libyan oil from global 
markets. Some of them cynically express their public regret for Libya’s continued 
inability to produce oil while all the time working in the background to support 
blockading forces… We do not need Russian and other foreign mercenaries in 
Libyan oilfields whose goal is to prevent oil production… While foreign 
mercenaries continue to be paid vast sums of money to prevent the NOC from 
carrying out its essential duties, the rest of the Libyan population suffers, not just 
through the absence of oil revenues but also through the loss to the nation of the 
 





disastrous decay of our oil infrastructure through corrosion and the inability of 
NOC staff to carry out essential maintenance.381 
 
This action matches the description of PMC operations noted by US military in 2018. 
They further noted that mercenaries earn of a share of the production proceeds from the oil fields 
they reclaim. PMCs may or may not choose to coordinate or deconflict with the Russian military, 
but they are recognized with combat awards by the Kremlin, and trained by the Russian Defense 
Ministry.382 Reuters reported that PMC personnel ‘fly to Syria on board Russian military aircraft 
which land at Russian bases. When they are injured, they are treated in hospitals reserved for the 
Russian military and get state medals.’383  
PMCs have also recently deployed elsewhere into Africa. It is important to remember that 
in IW, these benefits aren’t solely enjoyed by the element in question but by their partner force 
or proxy, and Wagner ‘improved the precision of LNA artillery and mortar rounds, exacted a 
damaging psychological toll with sniper fire, and enabled [Khalifa] Haftar’s forces to seize 
territory for the first time’ in Libya.384 Specifically, African nations working with a Russian 
PMC instead of America means avoiding the task of vetting one’s troops and commanders for 
human rights violations (those found would be excluded from training) and enjoying the benefits 
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of training with a proven, battle-hardened cadre. 385 Beyond Libya, Patriot Group (who has ties to 
the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Russian Aerospace Forces) 
has deployed to the Central African Republic (CAR) under a deal to provide CAR with “free 
military technical assistance” including five military instructors and 170 advisers.386  
Patriot is thought to be responsible for assassinating three journalists who were 
investigating Russian PMCs.387 Russian nationals Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksandr Rastorguev and 
Kirill Radchenko were ambushed in the town of Sibut in CAR according to the mayor, Henri 
Depele. They were making a documentary about Wagner Group for the Investigation Control 
Center, a Russian news outlet backed by Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky. Khodorkovsky is a 
billionaire and well-known critic of the Russian government who lives in exile in London.388 
Meanwhile, CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra has confirmed the role of Russian PMCs 
in CAR. CAR is suffering through sectarian violence that has killed tens of thousands of people 
and created more than a million refugees and thousands of child soldiers – 80 percent of the 
country is under the control of local warlords.389 It is also a trove of natural resources and wealth 
rich in gold, diamonds, and uranium. CAR’s political instability, international isolation, and 
inability to extract these resources by itself align with the following strategic points according to 
Berzins: iv. from war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial 
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irregular groupings; and ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, 
economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns.390  
Russia has used various conflict zones as a ‘battle lab’ model that provides information 
on products and tactics, and develops new concepts of operation fieldable to other elements; it 
also shapes future operations and concepts. It does this by exploring concepts, technologies, and 
tactics to advance capabilities, as well as promoting new technologies and procedures for 
operations, technology, and support to combat forces. 391 Typically, battle labs use models and 
simulations, however Russia’s IW strategy of coercion, limited military confrontation, and 
persistent (if implausible) denial allow PMCs to explore and identify best practices internally as 
well as ‘dry run’ and reconnoiter opposing parties’ TTPs and reactions for future operational use. 
PMC involvement in Ukraine was a proof of concept for the first two strategy points of Little 
Green Men: it dealt with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation as well as 
giving primacy to nonmilitary factors (information and intelligence). Their deployments to Syria 
and Libya have extended that primacy by securing economically viable infrastructure. In Africa 
they will have nothing resembling limitations or restraints. 
IV. NORTH KOREA 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly referred to as 
North Korea, is in a somewhat unique position on the list of the 4+1 (China, Russia, Iran, DPRK 
+ VEOs… or 2+3 – China, Russia + Iran, DPRK, and VEOs), depending on who one works for. 
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The dearth of information hinders true situational awareness the DPRK’s intent, but context can 
be useful. Kim provides a historic context both of the ruling Communist party and governing 
documents, describing their current situation as one that frustrates virtually all parties.392 
Southern neighbors the Republic of Korea (ROK) have always had a warm place in their hearts 
for what were, in many cases, familial relations across the border of the De-Militarized Zone 
(DMZ), but this is being replaced with disappointment and concern over the DPRK’s reckless 
and intimidating behavior. Meanwhile patron states China and Russia both have distanced 
themselves somewhat from nuclear brinksmanship that stands in outright defiance of a UN 
Security Council resolution.393 Conversely, Tasic suggests that the DPRK’s COG may have 
never been on the Korean peninsula… instead he suggests that it is actually their closest ally – 
China.394 The patronage of China to the DPRK would fit well with the concept of DPRK serving 
to push the boundaries of international norms, while China is seen to bring them around to 
reason (or not). Both reap the rewards of firm knowledge gained vis-à-vis red lines, tolerances, 
strategic, operational, and tactical reactions that may be particular to one administration or 
leader, etc… Similar to Russia’s use of PMCs, DPRK acts as the deniable, ‘wild card’ external 
party to China’s Peer-Competitor status.395 Observing the DPRK use of cyberwarfare, this 
relationship seems even more plausible. 
DPRK has 6,800 cyber-operators mostly associated with the Reconnaissance General 
Bureau; as opponents, the US, Japan and ROK are highly networked across their societies and 
present appealing cyber targets. Smaller and weaker nations may typically use asymmetric cyber 
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infrastructure targeting against more powerful nations, and the DPRK fall into this dynamic. All 
the more since the DPRK is essentially ‘firewalled’ from external networks with an economy 
that does not rely on information technology infrastructure, thus making retaliation exceptionally 
difficult.396 DPRK efforts have expanded to social engineering such as emails, text messaging, 
and other social media attacks to expose military secrets, create social discord and even national 
schisms. Attacks now include ordinary citizens and public facilities, particularly to demoralize or 
intimidate ROK policymakers. They have also improved their tradecraft with more covert and 
untraceable attacks.397 
DPRK cyber-attacks include espionage, as well as infrastructure and political system 
disruption of the ROK… government and private institutions, including the Nonghyup bank 
servers and cyber-attacks on multiple ROK media, banking and government organizations were 
attacked between 2011 and 2013. The first major attack on ROK critical hard infrastructure was 
an attempted attack on Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power in 2014. In keeping with their Chinese 
patrons, they have used American allies as cyber-targets to gain access to US as well as ROK 
strategic plans and senior military and Blue House (ROK capitol building) information equities 
via phishing and hacking attacks. Another nod to the Chinese is economic crime meant to gain 
currency to cope with ever-tightening sanctions. DPRK is blamed for an $81M robbery in 
Bangladesh and the global Wannacry virus.398 
DPRK criminal endeavors such as smuggling operations provide a means to bypass 
sanctions, sustain the survival of the regime, and continue the development of nuclear armament. 
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The business end of their revenue stream includes the manufacturing and distribution of drugs, 
counterfeit currency, and counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals as well as heroine and 
crystal methamphetamine. These operations are all managed by Office 39 (also known as Room 
39), which essentially operates as an organized crime headquarters element, and punishes 
betrayal or failure with assassination. In 2009, a Vanity Fair article cited Syung Je Park, of the 
ROK military affiliated think-tank Asia Strategy Institute. ‘They need money,’ says Park. 
‘Where else can they get it?’ Hwang Jang Yop was the regime’s chief ideologist and Kim Jong 
Il’s tutor until he defected. He was interviewed by Park, as was another thousand defectors. 
DPRK depends on international aid just to feed their people, and they have also branched into 
weapons dealing in order to bring in revenue. ‘More than 70 percent of the missiles’ components 
are imported from overseas.’399 High-seas shipping interdiction has revealed Cuba as one source 
of weapons being shipped to the DPRK.400   
As The National Interest points out, embargoed countries turn to each other when forced 
out of markets. Indeed, the Ghadir-class diesel-electric mini-submarines, though designed and 
manufactured in Iran, are derivative of North Korean Yugo and Sango class submarines.401 Iran 
uses its Navy to patrol the Persian Gulf and specifically the Straits of Hormuz (SOH). In this 
circumstance, diesel electric that are nearly undetectable for mine-laying are ‘ideal candidates for 
patrol and ambush operations against hostile surface vessels.’402   
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UN investigators believe VX nerve agent (VX) was sold to Syria by DPRK (goods were 
shipped directly to Syria’s chemical weapon agency403) to raise needed funds for their nuclear 
weapons development program. The assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017 
revealed the DPRK’s ability to utilize and manipulate human assets as well as move VX across 
international borders. In response, the US sanctioned the government of the DPRK for the 
violation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 
in the Kuala Lumpur airport; sanctions may cover foreign aid, military assistance and diplomatic 
relations. 404 Prior to this the US State Department’s most recent North Korea country report on 
terrorism stated it ‘is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a 
Korean Airlines flight in 1987.’405 This was the last in a string of terror attacks that included 
culmination of several incidents bombings, assassinations of government officials and the 
attempted assassination of ROK President Chun Doo-Hwan.406  
DPRK is a nation preparing for war, which explains why the tiny nation has the world’s 
fourth largest military.407 Decapitation of leadership to facilitate regime change is an obvious 
choice for operations, as is the targeting of strategic facilities in the DPRK. An IW planning 
context would allow for multiple redundancies, ruses (fake facilities, etc.) and decoys (the 
legendary body-double ploy). If China is truly the COG, these will extend into their terrain and 
domain, be it cyber, information, command and control or air defense. While the DPRK may 
 
403 Ian Bowers, ‘The use and utility of hybrid warfare on the Korean Peninsula,’ The Pacific Review 31, no. 6 
(2018): 773. 
404 Laignee Barron, ‘The U.S. Has Sanctioned North Korea Over the Assassination of Kim Jong Nam,’ time.com, 
last updated March 7th, 2018, https://time.com/5188920/north-korea-kim-jong-nam-chemical-weapons/. 
405 Robert E. Kelly, ‘Terrorism’s Place in South Korean Grand Strategy,’ The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 
29, no. 3 (September 2017): 419. 
406 Ian Bowers, ‘The use and utility of hybrid warfare on the Korean Peninsula,’ The Pacific Review 31, no. 6 
(2018): 773. 
407 Koo Sub Kim, ‘Substance of North Korea’s military threats and the security environment in Northeast Asia,’ The 




have stepped away from the spectacular international terrorism they conducted in the 80s, the 
communization of ROK remains a goal of the regime. This has been the limiting factor of inter-
Korean ties since the 6th convention of the Workers’ Party in 1980.408 Owing to this overt 
political aspect, IW is always a choice for the DPRK. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Within GPC, traditional warfare exists only as a theoretical threat, but IW remains a 
ubiquitous occurrence as it has historically. It is well documented that near-peer competitors, 
rogue states, and non-state actors utilize IW via terrorists, proxies, and other means to strike 
blows for their advancement without triggering actual conflict with America. Far from changing, 
Dr. Spencer B. Meredith at the National Defense University and LTC Mike P. Maloney of 
USASOC note that VEO patronage by China and Russia is on the increase and to be expected in 
the future.409 So it is that America can expect IW operations to remain the dominant form of 
warfare. 
American intelligence agencies should begin an extensive offensive counterintelligence 
recruitment and collection effort against the 4+1 array of threats. As John Schindler, National 
Security Agency (NSA) analyst and counterintelligence specialist notes: “The real pros engage in 
offensive counterintelligence… recruiting spies inside the enemy camp, particularly inside the 
opposing intelligence service. That’s how you gain control of the enemy’s central nervous 
system: You know what he knows about you; hence you can deceive him at a strategic level.”410 
Corporate partnerships and agreements must be secured to achieve security of American 
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Intellectual Property (IP). According to the United States Trade Representative (after a seven-
month investigation into China's IP theft), ‘Chinese theft of American IP currently costs between 
$225 billion and $600 billion annually.’ James Andrew Lewis, senior vice president at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies notes that ‘China has sought to acquire US technology by 
any means, licit or illicit… Espionage and theft were part of this, but so were forced technology 
transfers or mandatory joint ventures as a condition for doing business in China.’411  
To be clear, one must look at the bottom line financially. America should pursue 
economic war footing agreements (similar to WWII) against China to partner government and 
corporate efforts, harden defenses, and recoup money lost to China’s thieving. If such measures 
recouped annually such losses with 100% mathematic effectiveness (which is admittedly 
implausible), it would take approximately 4.7 years to recoup the money spent on the Iraq war 
(at the low end of the annual Chinese theft estimate – America spent $1.06T on Operation Iraqi 
Freedom).412 It would take approximately 1.8 years on the high end, assuming American 
recoupment of $600B annually, and while this example is more illustrative than literal, it is 
useful to provide a clear picture of the extent of China’s crimes.  
Nor is the term war footing a mistake. That is how it is being painted by Socialists, 
seeking to take the initiative and dominate the media narrative in light of the GPC-fueled arms 
race that is well under way.413 As Australia realizes its place in this picture and seeks to ramp up 
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military spending by 40%, it is hard to disagree with the idea.414 Strategically America must deal 
openly and honestly with the enemy and their ideology.  
America needs to consider where our real losses are occurring and what our economy 
might look like with a China that feared our response to their thievery. In terms of secondary and 
tertiary effects one could hardly ask for more benefit: IW and IO built upon the neutralization of 
China would form the basis of a narrative targeted against Russian, Iranian, and North Korean 
actions. Such actions would form the basis of a plan that highlights peace over war, and what 
happens before wars. This would be built upon the concept used in Counter-Terror Finance, i.e. 
if you want to do business with America, you cannot do business with China. The result of 
disaggregating China’s influence in illicit trade and black markets globally would break down 
supply chains that put money into Jihadi coffers and weapons into Jihadi hands. Muqawama 
makes clear the Islamist Jihadi model of warfare; they remain at war with America and will be 
for the foreseeable future. China, Russia, and Iran will use this in their GPC plan, because 
America’s current plan isn’t working. 
 











Our traditional approach is either we’re at peace or at conflict.  And I think that’s insufficient to 
deal with the actors that actually seek to advance their interests while avoiding our strengths.  
And as an aside, you know, I don’t find the current phasing construct for operational plans 
particularly useful right now.  If you think about it, we bend authorities and capabilities 
according to where we think we are in a phase.  And our adversaries, or potential adversaries, 
or our competitors, they don’t actually – they don’t actually find themselves limited by that same 
– by that same framework. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford415 
This paper has examined Irregular Warfare for the purpose of correcting American 
strategy. Corrections noted here are primarily policy driven, as these have been key to success 
previously. American popular buy-in, realistic policy and doctrine that provides defined end-
states, acknowledging the ideology of our enemies, and civilian oversight are starting points 
from which there will be a long road ahead. The past two decades have only emboldened 
America’s enemies and opponents to utilize IW because of her failure to translate tactical 
successes into strategic victory in Afghanistan and Iraq.416 As a republic, America’s COG 
remains her people. When our policy leaders and military have lost the support of the people, the 
results were overall failure. This occurred in Vietnam and American IW capability was rolled 
back for decades… it can easily happen again. Only a 9/11-level tragedy has the power today to 
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drive public calls for change in the military, and as such IW will almost certainly remain out of 
the public realm in the future. Consequently, that means that the various remedies offered below 
are unlikely to be implemented any time soon. 
I. AMERICAN POPULAR BUY-IN 
Throughout the 70s and 80s the military shifted to an all-volunteer force. When the draft 
went away, the ability of events to impact the American populace (the COG) was decreased. The 
American military and SOF specifically evolved into an American warrior caste.417 As President 
Lyndon Johnson’s former White House aide Joseph Califano stated ‘by removing the middle 
class from even the threat of conscription, we remove perhaps the greatest inhibition on a 
President’s decision to go to war.’418 In 2015 less than one half of one percent of Americans 
were on active duty with the military, with the resulting effect that most Americans have no 
connectivity to military matters at all.419 The Niger incident, and its aftermath, were thus muted 
compared to the outrage that would have been assumed in decades past. The deaths of 4 soldiers, 
though questioned, were analyzed and evaluated in-house by USSOCOM but quickly slipped out 
of American popular memory.420  
The public’s lack of visibility on the IW problem is compounded by a generally scarce 
amount of defense industry tied to IW. Defense industry and the military industrial complex is 
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well documented in its ability to skew congressional votes for funding and other resourcing for 
military programs – thus the projects that need a lot of funding provide jobs for their 
constituents. Examples are plentiful: in 1977, military orders accounted for 55 percent of 
shipbuilding construction in the United States. By 1985, this had become a 93 percent 
dependency of the shipyards upon the government, with the obvious realization that these funds 
were voted on and approved to keep jobs in certain congressional districts.421 As a result the 
military preferentially funds big ticket items. Hoffman noted: ‘At the time of the 9/11 attacks, 
Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space 
assets, precision weaponry, and information technology,’ which remarkably mirrors both the 
current direction of the DOD and the President’s direction to stand up the newest service, the 
Space Force.422 Drones provide a telling example – the DOD opted to use the U2 spy plane 
instead of the Global Hawk drone to realize a savings of $2.5B in 2012. When the Global Hawk 
manufacturer, Northrup Grumman, learned of it they essentially forced the DOD to buy their 
drone. This was accomplished when chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 
California Republican Buck McKeon, and Virginia Democrat Jim Moran of the House 
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee wrote a letter to incoming SECDEF Chuck Hagel 
pressing him to fund the acquisition of the Global Hawks…  
Meanwhile, Northrop’s political action committee had already made contributions 
of at least $113,000 to the campaign committee of House Armed Services 
Committee Chairman McKeon, who also happened to represent the Southern 
California district where Northrop’s assembly plant for the Global Hawk is 
located. Representative Moran, the co-author of the letter with McKeon, who 
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represented the northern Virginia district where Northrop has its headquarters, 
had gotten $22,000 in contributions.423 
 
II. REALISTIC POLICY, DOCTRINE & DEFINED END-STATES 
That America is conducting IW poorly and even wrongly is no longer in question.  Poor 
execution of American IW reveals predictable thematic failures which occurred in other IW 
campaigns such as piece-mealing forces into theater. Recurring problematic TTPs also include 
torture, insider attacks, and ignorance (perhaps even willful) of the enemy (Ho Chi Minh’s 
allegiance and Iraq’s lack of WMD come to mind). Two are critical and within the reach of 
policymakers to change: 
• Policy overreach without the full intent to execute the mission  
• Over-extension of an elite unit 
Policy overreach can be rectified with the use of doctrine that acknowledges long- and 
short-term effects and goes beyond party lines to illustrate proper activities and operations. When 
facing an existential threat such as Chinese multi-generational warfare, we cannot afford to do 
otherwise. Blurred Lines cites ‘an ever-decreasing level of knowledge of military history,’ ‘poor 
knowledge of military theory, particularly of the standard works such as Clausewitz’s On War 
and Sun Tzu’s Art of War,’ and ‘pressure to develop another microtheory (sic) to explain an 
element of political or military behavior or practice, and then to fit history into it,’ as 
demonstrated in the instance of the Crimean Annexation.424 Poor practitioner knowledge was 
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called out by Dr. Stephen Biddle on the West Point IW podcast, as he noted that there is simply 
poor doctrine being utilized… hybrid is not a term in American doctrine.425 
USSOCOM has a bias for kinetic action as does the American government but this has 
led to the overextension of the command. While it may brief well, reality suggests it executes 
poorly. The effects of SOF as the ‘go-to’ choice for nearly two decades of combat are startling: 
comprising just 3% of the Joint Force, SOF have sustained over 40% of total US casualties.426 
This culture of carrying on the mission even in the face of obviously broken concepts is widely 
adhered to both in the military generally and SOF specifically. As far back as 2011, Admiral 
Olson, then the USSOCOM commander, noted that manpower had doubled, budgets had tripled, 
but deployments had quadrupled. USSOCOM operators were showing signs of ‘fraying around 
the edges.’ 427 The doctrinally correct and accurate use of IW as a theory must be implemented 
and built out into a working model that includes an appropriate troop to task model across DOD. 
It has to be more than the castoff concepts the DOD doesn’t like because it doesn’t do them well. 
IW theory must be built out by removing the limits of the current joint definition and placing 
non-violent, Shaping aspects into consideration, forcing GCCs to improve IW engagement. TCPs 
without an IW plan should be rejected by policy makers. 
Corrections have been posited throughout the years: as early as 2004, Basilici and 
Simmons (notably under Thesis Advisor Hy Rothstein at the Naval Post-graduate School) 
proposed ‘legislation must be passed that separates the UW capability from the conventional 
 
425 Dr. Steven Biddle, ‘Does Building Partner Military Capacity Work?,’ July 2nd, 2020, in Irregular Warfare 
Podcast, by Princeton Empirical Studies of Conflict and West Point Modern Warfare Institute, podcast audio, 39:10, 
https://mwi.usma.edu/building-partner-military-capacity-work/. 
426 Mr. Mark Mitchell, ASD SOLIC Witness Statement for Hearing: Evolution, Transformation, and Sustainment: A 
Review of the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command – Subcommittee 
on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities (Committee on Armed Services) 
427 Andrew Feickert, US SOF: Background and Issues for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 




military by creating a new organization that could develop its own unique UW culture designed 
to carry out UW operations—the Department of Strategic Services. Only through legislation like 
this can the DoD truly transform.’428 In 2006, Hoffman felt the solution could be rendered as less 
of a creation and more of a transition: ‘In a world of persistent conflict, it is time to consider 
further institutionalizing SOCOM not as a separate joint command, but as a distinct service — 
the Special Operations Force (SOF)… SOCOM oversight billets already exist, and they exercise 
service-like programming and budget authority.’429 These are now joined by both Command 
Sergeant Major (Retired) Mike Hall and Colonel (Retired) Mark Mitchell (who also served as the 
ASD SOLIC) in an indictment of the Pentagon bureaucracy: 
In the absence of an empowered ASD(SO/LIC), the USSOCOM commander 
often ends up making critical decisions about SOF strategy, capability and force 
structure that should be made by civilian leaders. The net result is an inverted 
relationship runs counter to the concept of civilian oversight. It also runs counter 
to the law and the repeatedly expressed will of Congress. 
In 2016, Congress began to recognize that the resources, access, and influence of 
the USSOCOM commander had significantly outpaced the ability of 
ASD(SO/LIC). The changes in DoD had deprived the SecDef of fully informed 
and unadulterated policy advice regarding the employment of SOF and 
management of associated risks. It had also robbed the USSOCOM commander of 
the clear strategic guidance he deserves and the advocacy to balance the numerous 
competing demands. It also significantly reduced top cover for unpopular — but 
necessary — changes across the SOF enterprise. Consequently, the FY2017 
NDAA sought to strengthen the role of ASD(SO/LIC) as a “service secretary” for 
SOF. Sadly, that effort has met much resistance within DoD, and half-hearted 
implementation has produced limited effects. 430 
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The concept of the USSOCOM commander acting in a manner that is no longer military 
strategy but the purview of policy that is Grand Strategy is just the first step to consider. Nor is it 
coincidental that since 2004, new considerations and suggested means to change USSOCOM 
have been proffered. Now there are Command Sergeant Majors and Colonels driving efforts to 
make changes. The entire cultural construct of SOF and USSOCOM is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine, so a final statement must suffice. These changes are not improvements to help 
a system operate better, they are repairs needed to a system that is broken. 
III. IDEOLOGY 
Two brands of violent political ideology, Islamism and Communism, are found to be 
common threads in both the NDS and case study material. China is successfully messaging its 
political narrative such that many in America believe China to no longer be Communist. Islam is 
used by Iran and the VEOs to wage a global insurgency without end. American policy must 
embrace an anti-Communist slant to educate the populace and determine a proper approach to 
Islamist/Jihadi non-state actors. In terms of strategic failure, America has failed by trying to 
blandly buy into the concept of extremism; only recently has the enemy ideology been described 
as Islamist. As a result, the fact that America faces a global insurgency has been denied by some. 
Two voices which demand the truth be acknowledged stand out. CIA analysis in 1987 cited 
Hezbollah’s ‘aspirations to become a sponsor of worldwide Islamic fundamentalism…’ and that 
‘like their Iranian brethren, Hizballah (sic) maintains that the Islamic Revolution must be a 
worldwide phenomenon and cannot be confined within the boundaries of a singular country.’431 
Dr. David Kilcullen also made clear the global nature of the Islamist insurgency in 2005:  
 





the global jihad is clearly an insurgency – a popular movement that seeks to 
change the status quo through violence and subversion… this insurgency seeks to 
transform the entire Islamic world and remake its relationship with the rest of the 
globe. It looks back to a golden age, seeking to re-establish a Caliphate 
throughout the Muslim world and, ultimately, expand the realm of Islam (Dar al 
Islam) to all human society… Al Qaeda and similar groups feed on local 
grievances, integrate them into broader ideologies, and link disparate conflicts 
through globalized communications, finances and technology. In this, Al Qaeda 
resembles the Communist Internationale of the twentieth century – a holding 
company and clearing-house for world revolution. But whereas the Comintern 
was a state-sponsored support organization… the global jihad is itself an 
insurgent movement… the Islamist jihad seeks to form the basis for a new supra-
national state.432 
 
Understanding the concept of Muqawama or ‘persistent conflict’ must form the basis of a 
strategy that knows there will be decades more conflict ahead.433 When one mode of warfare 
fails, the other will be utilized, and wise warriors do not limit their options. America’s traditional 
warfare capability and lack of IW capability effectively guarantee that IW will be used against 
her first, though perhaps not exclusively. The IRB couldn’t fight Royal troops in the streets or 
fields… so they used Dynamite. Algerians couldn’t gain a tactical advantage, so they used 
atrocity to gain world attention when it induced French torture sessions. The PLO lost 
confidence in traditional warfare after the Six Day War, so they hijacked planes and killed 
Olympians. Russia didn’t need to start a war, they simply sponsored friendly militias. China 
doesn’t have to design new weapons; they just steal the plans. Al-Baghdadi knew his caliphate 
was doomed, so he transitioned from traditional warfare to IW. 
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IV. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 
In 1961, JFK identified IW as an operational capability America required and put the 
power of his office into the effort. He bypassed the DOD and outmaneuvered military 
parochialism at the highest ranks.434 The next impetus to create such a capability would be the 
Munich massacre in 1972, as governments globally sought response capabilities to spectacular 
terror attacks.435 Policy makers must determine what national goals American policy demands, 
then determine how all instruments of power, including the military, can be tasked to meet them. 
Grand Strategy trumps military operational considerations and will drive outcomes. Tactical 
security that approximates peace will fail to hold if strategic considerations of all parties don’t 
maintain peace long-term, as has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only by providing such 
goals can the military end-state be defined and strategically sound by linking them to policy. 
This is the role of civilian oversight of the military. 
The office of ASD SOLIC must be elevated to directly interface with the SECDEF as an 
Undersecretary at least. Neglect heaped onto ASD SOLIC is illustrated by the position remaining 
unfilled and temporarily manned by another officer: Mr. Christopher Miller is performing the 
duties of ASD SOLIC and is actually the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for 
Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (SOCT).436 Meanwhile, the military commander 
nominally reporting to ASD SOLIC, CDRUSSOCOM, has authority to directly interface with 
the SECDEF. This is an authority the ASD SOLIC does not enjoy. This leads to an improper 
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imbalance with CDRUSSOCOM acting in a manner that outstrips the supposed civilian 
oversight of the DOD.437 Today’s Joint Staff notes that the DOD must ‘sustain IW as a core 
competency for the entire Joint Force,438 not just SOF [Special Operations Forces].’ But the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, in what is almost a complete reversal, tasked the ASD SOLIC to 
develop a plan for institutionalizing IW in the DOD (directed in the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).439 
Even as the latest NDS reveals lip service to suggest IW is still important, the Pentagon is 
shown to clearly hamstring the ASD SOLIC (who is dual-hatted yet still tasked to implement the 
NDS directives).440 One immediate effect of this neglect is the cuts to USSOCOM’s budget: the 
DOD for FY 2021 is the first to roll back USSOCOM advances since 9/11. In order to ‘pay for’ 
future capabilities supporting the GPC for the Sister Services (all four) the FY 21 budget 
includes a 5 percent reduction overall to SOCOM, and a 12% reduction in procurement power.  
This proposed cut to SOCOM is explained away by the rationale that SOF has no role in 
GPC.441 This paper demonstrates otherwise… During the Cold War GPC played out as IW and 
today’s GPC will continue to play out as IW. IW would either be executed as warfare of choice 
by adversaries who cannot justify losing in traditional warfare or executed as warfare of 
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necessity by those who cannot address the US overmatch in defense posture. Iran, Russia, and 
Pakistan have backed the Taliban as a proxy force and they have fought America to a stalemate 
that ended at the negotiation table, not the signing of formal surrender documents.442 ‘The U.S. 
military has struggled against poorly-equipped insurgent groups in Iraq, Libya and Somalia, just 
to name a few other examples. U.S. adversaries have noticed.’443 
Policy makers must provide a balanced approach to defense preparations across the joint 
force of the DOD. Service Chiefs will never approve such moves as it is counter to their own 
self-interests. As has been shown, policy makers must be the guiding force in right-sizing IW 
versus traditional warfare efforts across manning, training, equipping, and resourcing streams of 
the DOD. Advanced weaponry, whether nukes or rail guns or hypersonic missiles, will keep 
driving proliferation brinksmanship but it will also keep forcing all parties to execute actions of 
competition below the threshold of war. The GPC is Irregular Warfare. The true threat of IW is 
that the most creative and adaptive minds will win the fight, whether they be rogue, peer or non-
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AQ: Al Qaeda 
ASD SOLIC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
BOG: Boots on the ground 
CAS: Close Air Support 
COG: Center of Gravity 
COIN: Counterinsurgency 
CT: Counterterrorism 
DASD: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic 
DOD: Department of Defense 
DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
FID: Foreign Internal Defense 
FLN: (Algerian) Front de Liberation National 
FM: Field Manual 
FY: Fiscal Year 
GCC: Geographical Combatant Commands 
GIGN: Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (National Gendarmerie Intervention 
Group) 
GPC: Great Power Competition 
GSG-9: Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (Border Guard Group 9) 




HTT: Human Terrain Teams 
ICBM: Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
IRB: Irish Republican Brotherhood 
ISIS: Islamic State or ‘Daesh’ 
IW: Irregular Warfare 
JFK: President John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
JP: Joint Publication 
JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command 
MARSOC: Marine Corps Special Operations Command 
MCDP: Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 
MISO: Military Information Support Operations 
NATO SOF: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act 
NDS: National Defense Strategy 
NKVD: People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization 
PME: Professional Military Education 
PMC: Private Military Contractors 
RAND: The RAND Corporation (Research And Development) 
ROK: Republic of Korea 
SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee  




SECDEF: Secretary of Defense 
SF: Special Forces 
SFA: Security Forces Assistance 
SFQC: Special Forces Qualification Course 
SOF: Special Operations Forces 
TCP: Theater Campaign Plans  
TRADOC: US Army Training and Doctrine Command 
USASOC: United States Army Special Operations Command 
USG: United States Government 
USSOCOM: United States Special Operations Command 
USSTRATCOM: United States Strategic Command 
UW: Unconventional Warfare 
VEO: Violent Extremist Organization 













Appendix A – SOF Truths 
 
Truth I: Humans are more important than hardware 
People – not equipment – make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and 
working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment available. On the other hand, 
the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people. 
Truth II: Quality is better than quantity 
A small number of people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger 
numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task. 
Truth III: Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced 
It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult 
and specialized SOF missions. Intense training – both in SOF schools and units – is required to 
integrate competent individuals into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened without 
degrading ultimate capability. 
Truth IV: Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur 
Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable 
special operations capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available SOF 
units in peacetime. 
Truth V: Most special operations require non-SOF assistance 
The operational effectiveness of our deployed forces cannot be, and never has been, achieved 
without being enabled by our joint service partners. The support Air Force, Army, Marine and 
Navy engineers, technicians, intelligence analysts, and the numerous other professions that 
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